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Foreword 
Over the course of our history, Atlantic has made some big bets designed to help solve major social issues. 
Needless to say, our 11-year, $70 million initiative to reform America’s immigration system certainly ranks 
among the biggest of such bets. Among the factors leading to our decision to take on this challenging work was 
our deep concern that millions of immigrants to the United States have been without access to basic rights 
accorded by law or common practice to the majority of Americans. As a result of a broken immigration system, 
far too many individuals and families have been left vulnerable to a wide range of discrimination and abuse in 
the workplace, in housing and in healthcare settings, among others. Undocumented immigrants increasingly 
face growing social marginalization and hostility from those whose ancestors arrived on our shores in earlier 
times. At the time we started this work, as far back as 2004, we also firmly believed there was a willingness at 
the federal level and in the United States Congress to find a workable solution. 
In 2013, we asked Innovation Network to help us take stock of the impact of and draw lessons from Atlantic’s 
efforts to advance federal immigration reform. Among the questions their examination helped answer: What 
strategies and tactics worked? Which didn’t? What obstacles did we and our grantees encounter? How well did 
we and other funders and advocates adapt? What is the next generation of challenges facing those who seek 
protection for vulnerable immigrants and their families? 
As you’ll see from their report, there was both hopeful progress and disappointment. Innovation Network 
reported that: 
We succeeded in helping build a campaign that unified multiple advocates behind an agenda focused on 
comprehensive federal reform; providing significant and early funding that attracted, inspired and assured 
additional funders; and built leadership and critical anchor organizations that raised the level and competence 
of the campaign in core features such as coordinated planning, communications and organizing. The 
community of advocates for immigration reform is far stronger, more visible and effective now than it was 
when we started. 
At the same time, a strategic decision to insist on comprehensive reform led some observers to point out that 
more people may have gotten relief faster using an incremental strategy. A greater effort to reach out to allies 
across partisan lines would have also benefitted the campaigns and movement. 
Although President Obama took executive action in 2014 to ease the threat of deportation for 4 million to 6 
million undocumented immigrants, problems of the US immigration system are far from resolved. While the 
partisan divide and gridlock in Congress makes advancing any major issue often seem fruitless—something 
none of us foresaw when we started this work years ago—the urgency of the need for immigration reform 
makes it essential that this effort continues.  
  
Because we are nearing the end of our life as a foundation, our work and funding of comprehensive 
immigration reform has concluded, as will everything else very shortly. However, it’s our hope that what we and 
our grantee collaborators learned over the past decade might enable others to do better as they press forward. 
In particular, we think our findings will be of relevance to: 
Funders—to inform their grantmaking practices, including how to empower activists through regranting funds 
and how to prioritize long-term support and short-term opportunities, to anticipate new pending and future 
challenges, and to consider potentially powerful responses. 
Advocates—to celebrate their successes as well as to consider options for refining strategies and tactics going 
forward. 
Students of immigration and other movements that protect the vulnerable—to understand the complex arc of 
advocacy as shaped by intentional strategies and tactics as well as history and on-the-ground realities and 
other external influences. 
With deep gratitude to the families involved and all our funder, grantee, and government partners,  
 
   
 
Christopher Oechsli  
President and CEO 
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Background 
In 2004 The Atlantic Philanthropies initiated a new area of grantmaking to protect immigrant rights in the 
United States. This area of grantmaking, within the Foundation’s Reconciliation & Human Rights Programme, 
would be part of broader support to the migration field for work in the United States, the Republic of South 
Africa, the Republic of Ireland, and Northern Ireland. In total, Atlantic has supported efforts in the migration 
field for more than 20 years and has made more than 120 grants in the migration field, totaling more than 
$120 million globally.1 
Atlantic’s contribution to immigration reform was but one part of a much larger effort. The Foundation’s 
investments focused on creating legislative policy change and were part of a larger universe of advocates 
engaging in building grassroots and inside-the-Beltway power; strengthening movement infrastructure; creating 
a compelling narrative to shape the public landscape; seeking administrative relief; and pursuing strategic 
litigation and judicial advocacy. Atlantic’s efforts benefited from the hard work of those who had come before: 
advocates who fought to “Fix ‘96”, advocates who sought to protect immigrant farmworkers through AgJobs in 
the 2000s, advocates who battled to make the best of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), advocates who 
worked with immigrants and refugees on resettlement and integration, and countless other efforts that built up 
the field of individuals and organizations ready to work on immigration reform alongside The Atlantic 
Philanthropies. 
The Atlantic Philanthropies is a limited life foundation. For the past few years Atlantic has been simultaneously 
continuing to work with and support US immigration reform advocates—and prepare its partners for its exit 
from the field. As part of Atlantic’s departure from its areas of grantmaking, the Foundation is supporting 
knowledge-generating projects designed to benefit Atlantic’s partners and issues. This report has been 
designed to be useful to a broad array of funders and social change strategists. 
In 2013 Innovation Network and Atlantic co-designed a research project to document and reflect on ten years 
of US immigration reform efforts and Atlantic’s grantmaking support (covering the decade from 2004 to 2014). 
The project focused on Atlantic’s role in US immigration reform—not the entire universe of US immigration 
reform. The project also focused on Atlantic’s efforts toward federal legislative change, and does not include 
significant state- and local-level efforts. The project was designed to build on existing documentation (such as 
Atlantic’s strategy and grant documents) and to collect new data from advocates, funders, informed observers, 
and others. We chose to think about this work as a reflective synthesis—a creation that is more than the sum of 
its parts and supportive to contemplation and learning for those who have toiled mightily to improve 
immigration and immigrant rights issues and for those who will continue the fight. 	
 
1 Malone, Connor. (December 2013). A Stock Take of the Migration Work Supported by Atlantic Philanthropies 
Advocacy, Politics, and Philanthropy: A Reflection on a Decade of Immigration Reform Advocacy 2 
Executive Summary 
This executive summary provides an overview of the research project’s findings, distills the essential problem 
Atlantic sought to solve, along with achievements, impacts, and challenges over the course of the Foundation’s 
efforts to reform federal US immigration laws. Although Atlantic’s efforts to help achieve comprehensive 
immigration reform fell short of federal legislative change, its work did help to coalesce and build a field of 
advocates and mobilize to take advantage of windows of opportunity in the political process, times when the 
potential for policy reform increased dramatically. 
This overview of findings focuses on: 1) Atlantic support; 2) the windows of opportunity for reform in the policy 
process; 3) Atlantic’s impact on immigration reform campaigns; 4) the impact of Atlantic’s support for the 
campaigns on the field of immigration reform advocates (beyond direct grantees); 5) the impact of this work on 
the overall issue of immigration; 6) general observations; and 7) future considerations. 
The Problem and the Rationale 
There are an estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants in the US. Their children attend American 
schools, they work beside us in the American economy, and yet, they live without a full set of civil and political 
rights. They cannot access the health, employment, educational, and other opportunities afforded to US 
citizens by virtue of being born beyond US borders. They constantly risk deportation and separation from their 
families. They are truly an underclass in American society, a society whose legitimacy rides on its democratic 
principles and protections for all. 
This is the rationale underpinning the work of The Atlantic Philanthropies and many, many other funders, 
advocates, activists, politicians, and others over the past ten years and more, who want to reform the broken 
US immigration system. The last decade of immigration reform advocacy spanned countless campaigns, 
initiatives, funder collaboratives, demonstrations and actions, lobby days, acts of civil disobedience, and 
election cycles, and played out against the backdrop of ongoing arrests of undocumented immigrants, 
deportations, and human rights infringements. In the US, immigration is primarily a federal issue—Congress 
decides all immigration-related regulations and the White House is responsible for enforcing immigration laws. 
Some US states have advanced legislation addressing immigration-related issues, but immigration was 
reconfirmed as a federal power in the 2012 Supreme Court ruling on the Arizona statute known as S.B.1070. 
From 2004 through 2014, Atlantic supported three campaigns: the Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform (CCIR, 2004 to 2007), Reform Immigration FOR America (RI4A, 2007 to 2012), and Alliance for 
Citizenship (A4C, 2013 to present). Additionally, Atlantic made grants directly and the campaigns re-granted 
funds to more than 70 immigration advocacy organizations. The Atlantic Philanthropies has not acted in a 
vacuum; it has been a part of a vibrant funding community including organizations such as the Ford 
Foundation, Unbound Philanthropy, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Hagedorn Foundation, the Open 
Society Foundations, and many others. 
What follows is a summary of the work and findings from the evaluation. 
“The only lasting change [for immigrants] would be changing the legal status of 
8 to 10 million people, and the only way [for immigrants] to access justice [is] 
to become legal [and] come out of the shadows.” 
Interview with funder. (March 2014). 
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Atlantic’s Support to US Federal Immigration Reform Efforts 
• In total, Atlantic directed $70.3 million over 10 years toward US federal immigration policy reform. 
This amount is part of its overall support for the global migration field, spanning more than 20 years, 
and during which it has made more than 120 grants totaling more than $120 million.2 
• Atlantic decided to pursue a campaign-based strategy for comprehensive immigration reform. This 
approach positioned a campaign—a formalized collaborative of many organizations—at the center of 
the strategy and reinforced the shared, strategic purpose of the initiative through structure, and to a 
lesser extent, to create fewer organizational dependencies for funds. 
• Atlantic’s grantmaking was a mix of ongoing, long-term funding (patient capital) and timely infusions 
of resources. Looking at funding over time, a consistent level of funding was maintained and was 
supplemented at key times (often the emergence of windows of opportunity) with additional resources. 
Plotted on an area chart over time, it creates the following picture: 
 
The Shape of Atlantic’s Grantmaking Dollars, 2004- 2014 
 
 
• Atlantic’s 501(c)(4) funding played a critical role in shaping the field of immigration reform, enabling 
organizations to be engaged in political and electoral processes. Atlantic Philanthropies was the 
biggest contributor of 501(c)(4) funding to the immigration reform field from 2004 to 2014. Donations 
from Atlantic’s and other 501(c)(4) groups made 501(c)(3) funding more effective, as research or 
educational materials could be used towards a strong legislative strategy, including lobbying. The 
501(c)(4) funding also enabled advocates to mobilize voters and exert more influence over legislators 
in their districts. Advocates point to the 501(c)4 funding as the reason legislators took them more 
seriously and listened more closely than they had previously. 
Windows of Opportunity 
• Atlantic helped create windows of opportunity through its support for campaigns that raised the 
visibility of the immigration reform issue and pressured lawmakers to pay attention to well-
positioned immigration reform policy advocates. There is a correlation between the efforts of a 
dedicated, vocal constituency in the immigration reform advocacy campaigns—CCIR, RI4A, and A4C—
and frequent opportunity windows. 
• The first window of opportunity to open—in part due to the first campaign, CCIR—began on April 7, 
2006 with the introduction of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (CIRA, S.2611). This bill 
 
2 Malone, Connor. (December 2013). A Stock Take of the Migration Work Supported by Atlantic Philanthropies 
Around the World. Internal Report. 
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passed the Senate but stalled in conference committee. The 109th Congress adjourned in January 
2007 without advancing CIRA. 
• The next window opened shortly thereafter, in May 2007, with the Comprehensive Reform Act of 2007 
(S.1348) in the 110th Congress. CCIR went on the offensive to move and improve this bill. It died in the 
Senate and forced campaign members to rethink their strategies attempting to effect comprehensive 
immigration reform. 
• In mid-2008, another window of opportunity materialized as then-candidate Senator Barack Obama’s 
presidential campaign gained momentum and high-ranking campaign officials promised immigration 
reform advocates that if, elected, the new president would make federal immigration reform 
legislation a priority. Funders and advocates redoubled their efforts and mobilized support at the 
grassroots level for Obama and other pro-immigration reform advocacy candidates running for office 
across the country. The Latino vote was a critical piece of this effort. 
Atlantic’s Impact on Immigration Reform Campaigns 
• Atlantic chose to reconstitute the field of immigration reform to create a strong, unifying campaign 
body to amplify the debate and to take advantage of windows of opportunity. In 2004, proponents of 
immigration reform had been working for the previous eight years on mostly small-scale, policy 
advocacy. Atlantic and CCIR chose to create a campaign with a singular policy objective which 
galvanized a significant portion of a field into coordinated action. The field of advocates was no longer 
waiting for a window of opportunity for policy reform but were creating the urgency and focus 
necessary to unite and inspire the field. 
Impact of Atlantic and the CCIR, RI4A, and A4C Campaigns on Immigration 
Reform 
• Atlantic and the campaigns’ influx of resources and expertise over 2004 to 2014 raised expectations 
about what effective advocacy looks like. The level of professionalism increased and will remain in 
the field for some time to come. Additionally, ongoing grantmaking (i.e., patient capital) allowed for 
stable individual and organizational leadership and space for new leaders. 
• The influx of Atlantic dollars was perceived as an enticement to other funders to enter a field that 
was increasingly well resourced and well poised for success. The Four Freedoms Fund, established in 
2003, became the most visible pooled fund in the immigration field. Although Atlantic did work in 
concert with other grantmakers through informal communication and coordination of program officers, 
it did not participate in the fund due to differences in priorities and the Foundation’s strong focus on 
legislative policy change. 
Atlantic’s Impact on Immigration Policy 
• Beginning with RI4A and the campaign’s enhanced use of grassroots mobilizing, immigration reform 
advocates laid a foundation for longer-term power-building that may be the greatest legacy of 
Atlantic’s funding. In 2008, thousands of Americans were catalyzed into immigration reform 
advocates—a power block that grew over time and became increasingly visible. Now there are powerful 
factions of the grassroots movement such as DREAMers, Undocumented and Unafraid, National Day 
Laborer Organizing Network’s (NDLON) Not One More campaign, the FIRM Network, and others. Many 
advocates within the ecosystem supported by Atlantic joined forces with DREAMers and others in 
support of DACA. 
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General Observations and Challenges 
• While there were gains in capacity and engagement in the political process, there were also setbacks, 
such as the high deportation rates during the same period.3 
• The prospects of immigration reform have been seriously impacted by other issues: 9/11, the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the Great Recession, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Ebola, the 
Migration Crisis stemming from the Syrian Civil War, etc. Also, in the 2000s many places in the US 
witnessed the arrival or approach of majority-minority status, fueling debate about American identity, 
the role of immigrants, and, at times, xenophobia. 
• The comprehensive immigration reform strategy envisioned by Atlantic began as bipartisan or 
nonpartisan but became increasingly partisan over the years. The US Congress is in a period of 
entrenchment and gridlock makes advancing any issue difficult, and the partisan nature of later 
campaign activities may have led to missed opportunities. Some advocates within the immigration 
reform field believe more could have been done to secure deep, meaningful bi-partisan support, while 
others believe that bi-partisan support was fostered and evident (for example, the 30 House 
Republicans who were thought to be ready to support an immigration reform bill alongside an 
estimated 200 House Democrats).4 
• A persistent criticism of the comprehensive immigration reform strategy has been advocates’ 
adherence to an all-or-nothing strategy. A cadre of long-standing immigration reform leaders worked to 
keep DREAMers from splitting from the broader immigration reform movement and seizing the 
possibility of reform for a portion of the 11 million immigrants. Many critics of CCIR, RI4A, and A4C 
suggest that immigration reform would be better served by incremental changes over time. 
Conversely, Atlantic’s focus on immigrant rights required a strategy that provided a path to citizenship 
for all immigrants, and incremental solutions were not a top priority to Atlantic. 
Looking Forward 
• Highlighting lessons learned from IRCA and DACA, there is not enough field capacity to process 
potentially 11 million applicants if comprehensive immigration reform were achieved.5 This is 
especially true in areas of the US with new and rising immigrant populations, and resources have yet 
to be applied to building these capacities among immigrant-serving organizations. Many interviewees 
were perplexed about the immigration reform field’s capacity to affect widespread, long-term 
improvements in the future. 
• Though President Obama’s executive actions were designed to ease the threat of deportation for 4 
million to 6 million undocumented immigrants, the US immigration system is far from resolved. 
Federal policy change is still necessary to bring about a long-term, durable solution for undocumented 
immigrants living within the country. Some fear increased scrutiny for the approximately 7 million 
undocumented immigrants who are not eligible for DACA or DAPA. As a result, the next opportunity for 
federal immigration policy change may be in 2017 (after the 2016 presidential election), or 2020 
(after a few rounds of electoral politics).  
 
3 The Growth of the U.S. Deportation Machine. In Immigration Policy Center. Retrieved from 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/growth-us-deportation-machine. 
4 America’s Voice. (2013, August 23). Getting to a Majority: More House Republicans Come Out for Citizenship. 
Retrieved from http://americasvoice.org/research/getting-to-a-majority-more-house-republicans-come-out-for-
citizenship/. 
5 Key Informant Interviews. (March – April 2014). 
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Introduction 
Issues of immigration are at the core of the American identity. We are a country founded in part by immigrants, 
and we are the heirs to a collective struggle to define inclusion, identity, and rights within our democracy. In 
November 2014 President Obama announced the biggest change to immigration reform in more than a 
decade: Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA). The new DAPA 
program will allow undocumented people who have a US citizen or lawful permanent resident son or daughter 
to apply for work authorization and protection from deportation, if the person has been in the US since January 
1, 2010. DAPA is estimated to cover 4 million to 6 million people. In the November 20, 2014 immigration 
announcement President Obama also announced an expansion of the DACA program to cover an estimated 
additional 300,000 people.6 
Before the DAPA announcement, the last major legislative immigration reform that led to the resolution and 
improvement of status for immigrants to the US occurred in 1986. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986 (IRCA) “provided a path to legal permanent residence and citizenship for several categories of 
unauthorized immigrants” and led to nearly 2.7 million individuals becoming legal permanent residents.7  
Ten years later, in 1996, another major reform—the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)—was approved by Congress but criticized for its harsh terms, such as “stripping federal 
courts of the ability to police the government's enforcement of immigration laws [(judicial review)]”; “unfair 
detention of immigrants”; “use of secret evidence”; and “summary removal.”8 Efforts to overturn IIRIRA’s harsh 
terms would quickly emerge, resulting in the “Fix ‘96” immigration reform fight that played out in the late 
1990s and continues through today. 
Then over two days in early September 2001 (September 5 – 6), US President George W. Bush and Mexican 
President Vicente Fox met for a state visit, and a top issue was immigration. Immigration reform advocates 
were cautiously optimistic that the talks might lead to at least a partial solution to the country’s ongoing 
immigration strife. Then came the events of September 11, 2001 which changed America and the way that 
many Americans viewed immigrants—and opened the door for anti-immigration advocates to portray a broad 
swath of immigrants as potential terrorists or at the very least insidious infiltrators who sought to erode the 
United States. 
In addition to these immigration-related issues that are part of the story of today’s immigration reform fight, 
there are also the ever present forces of politics and economy. The 1990s and early 2000s have seen a time 
of economic highs and lows, with unemployment issues escalating in the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009. 
The period has also seen major shifts in demographics and politics, with increasingly contested elections and 
the emergence of purple places and states that signal a changing electorate and changing social, cultural, and 
religious norms. And looking outward, we are reminded that the US immigration issue is one expression of a 
complicated international system of economics, politics, policies, security, and opportunity. 
Though President Obama issued an historic executive order in November 2014, the issue is far from laid to 
rest. There are still daily humanitarian crises at the border. There are still millions of family members overseas, 
 
6 National Immigration Law Center (NILC). (2014, November 26). Executive Action Summary. Retrieved from 
http://www.nilc.org/execactionsummary.html. 
7 Baker, Brian C. (October 2010). Naturalization Rates among IRCA Immigrants: A 2009 Update. Homeland 
Security Fact Sheet. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/irca-natz-fs-
2009.pdf. 
8 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). (1999, July 28). ACLU Joins "Fix '96" Campaign for Justice for 
Immigrants. Retrieved from https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/aclu-joins-fix-96-campaign-justice-
immigrants. 
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waiting to be reunited with their loved ones in the US but stuck in a years-long visa backlog. There are still 
thousands of young people who, due to a lack of status, are unable to fully assume the promise of the 
American Dream and have easy access to educational and employment opportunities. There are still families 
who are separated by deportation. And we are still a nation struggling with how to integrate the most recent 
influx of immigrants to our nation to maintain the health of our democracy.	
 
Atlantic Philanthropies’ Investment in US 
Immigration Reform 
Atlantic Philanthropies was established and made its first grant in 1982. In 1997 the Foundation emerged 
from anonymity and by 2001 had defined a Reconciliation & Human Rights program area within its US-based 
grantmaking. In 2004 Atlantic initiated a strategy to protect immigrant rights within the Reconciliation & 
Human Rights Programme which, over the next ten years, would award $70.3 million to US federal immigration 
policy reform. To broaden the ability to fund immigration work, the US subsidiaries of The Atlantic 
Philanthropies created The Atlantic Advocacy Fund (AAF), a 501(c)(4) social welfare organization.9 Globally, 
Atlantic has supported efforts in the migration field in the United States, the Republic of South Africa, the 
Republic of Ireland, and Northern Ireland for more than 20 years and has made more than 120 grants in the 
migration field, totaling more than $120 million.10 
Atlantic and its staff designed their immigration reform strategy to be game-changing and aggressive. The 
Atlantic Philanthropies have been governed by Mr. Chuck Feeney’s giving while living ethos, that “you should 
use your wealth to help people.” The Foundation is known for making significant, bold investments to improve 
people’s lives now instead of releasing foundation assets in a slow, perpetual trickle. By 2016 Atlantic will 
conclude grantmaking and by 2020 the Foundation will conclude its operations. There is no time like the 
present.  
 
9 For convenience, this report uses “Atlantic” to refer to both The Atlantic Philanthropies and The Atlantic 
Advocacy Fund without distinguishing the two. 
10 Malone, Connor. (December 2013). A Stock Take of the Migration Work Supported by Atlantic Philanthropies 
Around the World. Internal Report. 
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Timeline of Atlantic Philanthropies’ Grantmaking, 1982 to 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Atlantic Philanthropies’ website (www.atlanticphilanthropies.org); Key Informant Interviews. 
 
These characteristics are woven into the fabric of every Atlantic effort. In the federal immigration reform 
strategy, foundation staff sought to identify the course of action that would result in a durable, dramatic 
improvement in the human rights of immigrants living within the United States. In 2001 when foundation 
staff began planning for new work in the area of human rights they identified two threads embedded within the 
Reconciliation & Human Rights Programme: human rights and 
immigrants. In the design of a new grantmaking strategy, foundation 
staff came to the decision that to create lasting change for the then 8 to 
10 million undocumented immigrants living within the US, federal 
immigration policy would need to change. And to do so Atlantic would 
support a powerful collection of activists and advocates to fight for 
federal immigration reform. 
In 2004 Atlantic awarded its first grant in support of federal 
immigration reform to a newly created campaign entity—the Coalition 
for Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CCIR). CCIR was a newly 
minted, 501(c)(4) organization designed as a collaboration between ten 
organizational members: National Immigration Forum; National Council 
of La Raza; Center for Community Change; National Asian Pacific 
American Legal Consortium; Piñeros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste; 
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles; Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights; New 
York Immigration Coalition; Service Employees International Union; and Hotel Employees and Restaurant 
Employees International Union. Atlantic granted CCIR $3 million over 18 months to support the start-up of “a 
non-partisan, issue focused grassroots and grasstops campaign designed to achieve comprehensive 
immigration reform in the US.”11 
The first grant to CCIR in March 2004 was guided by the strategic directive that, “By 2008, a comprehensive 
and rights-centered version of recent proposals to protect the rights of US immigrants, both documented and 
undocumented, will have been enacted.” The grant agreement was infused with three key principles: 
 
11 Atlantic Philanthropies. (2004, February 11). Grant Recommendation Rationale, App. 12601. 
Members and collaborators 
were to work toward federal 
immigration policy change that 
included a path for earned 
legalization for undocumented 
workers in the US today, 
promoted family unity, and 
provided legal channels for 
future foreign workers. 
1982: Atlantic 
Philanthropies is 
established and makes 
first grant 
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1. To be successful in creating the power and opportunity for federal legislative reform, CCIR was a 
strategy to connect and leverage the respective strengths of grassroots and grasstops (inside-the-
Beltway) organizations. 
2. To be successful in creating a broad public and political base of support, CCIR was to engage 
constituencies and encompass issues broader than Latinos. 
3. To be successful in federal legislative advocacy, CCIR and its messages were to be non-partisan. 
Atlantic’s expectation for CCIR was to be more than the sum of its parts—for CCIR to emerge as a new, uniting 
force for immigration reform that provided an umbrella for a variety of organizations and advocates to work in 
collaboration. Members and collaborators were to work toward federal immigration policy change that included 
a path for earned legalization for undocumented workers in the US today, promoted family unity, and provided 
legal channels for future foreign workers (“future flow”). 
CCIR was the embodiment of Atlantic’s decision to pursue a campaign-based strategy for comprehensive 
immigration reform. The campaign approach positioned a campaign—a formalized collaborative of many 
organizations—at the center of the strategy compared to other grantmaking approaches such as grants to 
individual organizations. Supporting a campaign was intended first and foremost to reinforce the shared, 
strategic purpose of the initiative through structure, and to a lesser extent, to create fewer organizational 
dependencies for funds. The emphasis on campaigns would continue for the next decade of Atlantic’s support 
to US immigration reform. 
Since 2004 and Atlantic’s first grant to CCIR, ten years have passed and the field of immigration reform has 
changed in many ways. To date Atlantic has awarded $70.3 million grant dollars, there have been three 
iterations of immigration reform campaigns, and three program officers have left their mark on Atlantic’s 
immigration reform strategy. One of the most noticeable changes among advocates is the emergence and 
success of DREAMers12—young, undocumented immigrants who have made a public stand for their right to the 
American Dream and garnered widespread support for the cause of immigration reform. And though not very 
visible, immigration reform advocates working through the courts, such as the Heartland Alliance and the 
American Civil Liberties Union, have made significant progress protecting and defending immigrants’ rights. 
While Atlantic and CCIR’s original objective of securing comprehensive immigration reform by 2008 was not 
achieved, other important developments have occurred that offer a valuable exploration of changes in the 
immigration reform field over the past ten years and one funder’s strategy for channeling a field’s collective 
wisdom and power into an audacious policy fight. 
 
 
 
 
12 DREAMers are individuals who meet the general requirements of the Development, Relief, and Education for 
Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. DREAM Act general requirements include: unauthorized immigrants who are under 
the age of 31; entered the United States before age 16; have lived continuously in the country for at least five 
years; have not been convicted of a felony, a “significant” misdemeanor, or three other misdemeanors; and are 
currently in school, graduated from high school, earned a GED, or served in the military. The federal DREAM Act 
has yet to be approved by US Congress. 
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Defining the Field of Immigration Reform  
 
Throughout this publication we use the term “the field of immigration reform” to encompass the myriad 
individual, organizational, and campaign actors who shared a purpose of changing federal immigration policy 
to better protect the human rights of undocumented immigrants within the US.  
We define the field of immigration reform as broader than the set of actors working toward federal 
immigration policy change to also include actors working toward protecting the human rights of 
undocumented immigrants within the US by other means such as local/state advocacy, stopping deportation, 
wage theft recovery, support for state level litigation to mitigate laws seeking to restrict the rights of 
immigrants, support for voter engagement of new citizens and others in support of immigrant rights, journalist 
engagement and education, and support of convenings between grassroots and grasstops leaders in the 
field. 
The field includes grassroots, grasstops, policy, and lobbying organizations.  
In other disciplines, “the field” may imply only grassroots organizations. That is not how the term is used in 
this report. 
 
 
Photo: Atlantic Philanthropies, https://www.flickr.com/photos/atlanticphil/5816315790/in/photostream/ 
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The Immigration Reform Eras: CCIR, RI4A, & A4C 
Since Atlantic entered the US immigration reform field in 2004, Atlantic has supported three iterations of 
immigration reform campaigns: the Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CCIR), Reform 
Immigration FOR America (RI4A), and Alliance for Citizenship (A4C). 
The goal of the immigration reform campaigns has always been to be so effective that they essentially work 
themselves out of business: once comprehensive immigration reform is achieved, the campaign will be 
disbanded. However, because comprehensive immigration reform continues to elude the US, the campaigns 
have been coordinating the activities of the field for the last ten years, which is a feat in itself. The following 
section looks in greater detail at the genesis and evolution of the field before the campaign period and 
subsequently each of the three campaigns for immigration reform. 
Immigration Reform before Atlantic Involvement 
IRCA. Immigration reform advocates existed and grew in power before Atlantic entered the fray in 2004. The 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 is a “complex and often confusing collection of laws”13 that address 
everything from immigrant quotas to refugee and asylum protections. These laws have been amended over the 
last 60 years, and provide a framework in which a network of pro-immigrant groups was able to coalesce. 
An informal network around immigration reform began to form in the early 1980s, brought together by a 
consortium of religious funders. The coalitions and grassroots groups were able to share information and 
advocate for immigration reform legislation.14 The National Immigration Forum (NIF), founded in 1982, became 
“the centerpiece of the alliance activities.”15 The field successfully advocated against comprehensive 
immigration reform legislation in 1982 and 1984 because that proposed legislation was too compromised to 
be satisfactory to the field.16 However, pro-immigrant actors did see mixed success in 1986, when their 
advocacy, complemented by a sympathetic Reagan administration, resulted in the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA). 
IRCA’s goals were to provide amnesty through a path to legalization for immigrants who could show they had 
been living in the US for at least four years, while simultaneously stemming the tide of immigrants by 
strengthening the border. Employers were also faced with sanctions if they employed undocumented 
immigrants. Indeed, IRCA did allow about 2.7 million immigrants to obtain green cards, but left about 2 million 
undocumented immigrants without papers. When the House failed to follow the Senate’s lead and take action 
in 1989 to address the issue of mixed-status families, where a spouse or child did not meet IRCA criteria but 
other family members did, President George H.W. Bush provided relief in 1990 through the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) to advance a “family fairness” policy, putting in place the Senate bill. Congress 
then passed the policy later in the year.17 
 
13 Giovagnoli, Mary. (2013, February 14). Overhauling Immigration Law: A Brief History and Basic Principles of 
Reform. Retrieved from http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/overhauling-immigration-law-brief-
history-and-basic-principles-reform. 
14 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Taylor, Andrew. (2014, November 17). Reagan And Bush Made The Same Immigration Move That Has The 
GOP Enraged At Obama. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/reagan-and-bush-made-immigration-
executive-orders-2014-11. 
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IRCA also fell short on its border and employer sanctions pieces 
in implementation. Funding was not allocated sufficiently to 
border security, and the employer sanctions of IRCA were 
gutted during negotiations in an attempt to gain the business 
community’s support. In IRCA’s final form, employers would not 
be held accountable if their hires had relatively genuine-looking, 
though falsified, documents showing legal status.18 
The field was a lot smaller in the 1980s, primarily operating in 
six states: California, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Florida, and 
Texas.19 While IRCA was a breakthrough, providing relief to 
millions of undocumented workers, the field of immigration 
reform advocates was not unified in its support. “You could say 
there was strong tension in the field then—that national groups 
wanted IRCA and supported legislative attempts and that there 
were many in the field, who called themselves left of center, who thought giving amnesty was a sell-out 
because it came with the parallel introduction of the employer sanctions.”20 
IIRIRA—“Fix ’96.” The next major landmark in immigration reform came in 1996. Unsatisfied with continued 
unauthorized immigration, President Bill Clinton signed into law the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). The harsh provisions in this legislation spurred activists in the field to 
action, and in 1999 a campaign called “Fix ’96: Restore America’s Tradition as a Nation of Immigrants and a 
Nation of Just Laws” was launched by a consortium of national organizations. The National Immigration Forum 
initiated the campaign, but many other groups were involved, among them the US Catholic Conference and the 
ACLU.21 Fix ’96 was a way to “restore the rights stripped from noncitizens and to address the particularly harsh 
and punitive elements of the new law.”22 These included (but were not limited to): 
• Expanded definition of criminal activity that could be applied retroactively to undocumented 
immigrants; 
• Expanded application of mandatory detention and deportation; 
• Fast-tracked deportations; and 
• Barred reentry for undocumented immigrants, sometimes permanently. 
AgJOBS. As IIRIRA was going into effect, agribusiness also began lobbying, in the second half of the 1990s, for 
a new agricultural guestworker program or a revised H-2A program,23 that came to be known as AgJOBS. 
 
18 Suro, Roberto. (1989, June 18). 1986 Amnesty Law is Seen as Failing to Slow Alien Tide. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/18/us/1986-amnesty-law-is-seen-as-failing-to-slow-alien-tide.html.; And 
Plumer, Brad. (2013, January 30). Congress Tried to Fix Immigration Back in 1986. Why Did It Fail? Retrieved 
from http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/30/in-1986-congress-tried-to-solve-
immigration-why-didnt-it-work/. 
19 Key Informant interview. (April 2014). 
20 Ibid. 
21 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). (1999, July 28). ACLU Joins "Fix '96" Campaign for Justice for 
Immigrants. Retrieved from https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/aclu-joins-fix-96-campaign-justice-
immigrants. 
22 Anadon, Isabel. (2013, May 1). Immigration Reform: Whatever Happened to ‘Fixing ’96?’” Retrieved from 
http://www.latinopolicyforum.org/blog/immigration-reform-what-happened-to-fixing-96. 
23 H-2A visas are for temporary agricultural workers, as opposed to H-1B visas, which are for those with 
professional skills. H-2A visas are not capped at a quota and can extend to cover families, though those 
 
“You could say there was strong 
tension in the field then—that national 
groups wanted IRCA and supported 
legislative attempts and that there 
were many in the field, who called 
themselves left of center, who 
thought giving amnesty was a sell-out 
because it came with the parallel 
introduction of the employer 
sanctions.” 
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Several bills were introduced in Congress, though they all would have made undocumented agricultural 
laborers more vulnerable by revising wage, housing, and other provisions unfavorably. Those bills were not 
supported by farmworker advocates, though growers did try to push them through. Latino organizations were 
increasing in power at this time, and a broad coalition of Latino organizations and other farmworker advocates 
harshly criticized the various bills.24 
While not a formal coalition, organizations trying to influence the legal status of farmworkers were able to work 
together to advance AgJOBS. The different groups involved—those on the side of farmworkers, those for 
growers, and Congress—were finally able to compromise in appropriations bills that were being debated in 
December 2000. It included a legalization program for undocumented farmworkers, and revised the H-2A visa 
program in ways that were a compromise for both farmworkers and growers. Ultimately the compromise did 
not become law, because certain senators opposed granting immigration status to “lawbreakers.”25 In 2001, 
Congress tried again, beginning with Senator Larry Craig and Representative Chris Cannon’s bills, which 
included some elements of the compromise but removed key protections for undocumented workers. These 
met with strong opposition from farmworkers, and over 100 national and state-based organizations coalesced 
to send letters to members of Congress opposing the bills.26 
The Whole Enchilada. Simultaneously, President George W. Bush took office and found a very willing 
negotiation partner in President Vicente Fox of Mexico. In part backed by foundation dollars,27 Presidents Bush 
and Fox began a dialogue about what Mexico’s foreign minister Jorge Castañeda called “the whole enchilada”: 
comprehensive immigration reform that would give legal status to millions of Mexican laborers in the US, as 
well as create a temporary worker’s visa for many, many more. President Bush was game: on September 5 – 6, 
2001, President Fox visited President Bush, discussing what would be satisfactory and realistic to both sides 
regarding the large undocumented Mexican population in the US.28 At this time the field thought that 
immigration reform might be relatively easy to achieve. “There was an emerging bipartisan consensus; 
President Bush was very focused on the issue. And the key thing at that point was creating a consensus among 
 
families may not work in the US. See http://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-2a-
agricultural-workers/h-2a-temporary-agricultural-workers. 
24 Farmworker Justice. (n.d.). The Road to AgJOBS: History Leading to the Negotiations [PDF file]. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/files/documents/AgJOBS%20The%20History%20Leading%20
to%20Negotiationsfinal.pdf. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Farmworker Justice. (n.d.). The Road to AgJOBS: History Leading to the Negotiations [PDF file]. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/files/documents/AgJOBS%20The%20History%20Leading%20
to%20Negotiationsfinal.pdf.; and Farmworker Justice. (2001, August 1). Support Migrant Farmworkers—
Oppose Craig/Cannon “Guestworker” Proposals [PDF file]. Retrieved from 
http://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/files/documents/p3%208-1-
2001LtrOpposingCraigCannon.pdf.; and Farmworker Justice. (2001, October 26). Coalition of 118 
Organizations Opposes H-2A Legislation to Cut Farmworker Wages[PDF file]. Retrieved from 
http://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/files/documents/p4%2010-26-
01SignOnOpposingCannon.pdf. 
27 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
28 Campbell, Duncan. (2001, September 5). Mexico Goes for the Whole Enchilada. Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/05/immigration.usa.; and Mexican Immigration 101. (2007, 
December 19). In Bloomberg Businessweek Magazine. Retrieved from 
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-12-19/mexican-immigration-101.; and the White House 
Presidential News and Speeches. (September 2001.) Retrieved from http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/. 
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key stakeholders in the labor movement…about what federal reform should be to apply to 
undocumented…issues.”29 
9/11/2001. Of course, the Fox-Bush talks did not move forward successfully. Like so many other issues, the 
issue of relief for undocumented Mexican immigrants ground to a halt when 9/11 happened, and across the 
US “anti-immigration sentiment blossomed.”30 Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim and South Asian (AMEMSA) 
communities were routinely profiled and experienced hate crimes and prejudice. Immigrants got caught up in 
the “conflation between a post-9/11 crackdown and a national security approach” and experienced significant 
backlash at the federal level.31 Immigrant rights organizations reoriented towards state policies and the 
challenges to civil liberties being faced by these communities.32 Immigration reform found itself in unfriendly 
territory: it became increasingly politicized. “I would point to 9/11/01 as the date where immigration was 
politicized. It just wasn’t politicized by immigrant advocates, but by nativists who then spent from about 2001 
to 2006 just beating the crap out of immigrant rights folks.”33 Many media outlets spouted vehement anti-
immigrant sentiment on a daily basis, and the language of “illegals” became the norm in the US immigration 
lexicon. 
Something had to be done to fix both the perception of immigrants by US citizens, as well as to fix what 
became labeled the “broken” US immigration system. In the early 2000s, diverse pro-immigrant parties in the 
US—labor, agriculture, community organizations, and many others—were calling for comprehensive immigration 
reform as a remedy. Concurrently, The Atlantic Philanthropies began an 18-month strategic planning process in 
2001 that assessed the question of what area they could have real impact on, considering both their 
remaining years and potential grant monies. Immigration reform fit nicely with their desire to focus on human 
rights as well as with the talk about immigrants and rights that existed across the Reconciliation & Human 
Rights portfolio. As their research evolved, so did their conviction that “the only lasting change would be 
changing the legal status of 8 to 10 million people, and the only way [for immigrants] to access justice was to 
become legal [and] come out of the shadows.”34 Having run into restrictions funding 501(c)(3) organizations in 
the past, they also put a lot of thinking into how Atlantic “could be a real force for change and use its offshore 
status to do so.”35 
Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
At this time, The Atlantic Philanthropies’ Reconciliation & Human Rights Programme Executive approached 
expert organizations and individuals on the ground, some of whom had over a decade of experience working in 
the immigrant rights/immigration reform field. In January 2003, the National Immigration Forum, the National 
Council of La Raza, and the Center for Community Change brought together key stakeholders to have a 
dialogue around coordinating efforts toward a goal of achieving comprehensive immigration reform. 
Stakeholders included labor unions, immigrant advocates, business interests, ethnic advocacy organizations, 
and immigrant policy groups. Sustaining a campaign advocating for immigration reform was the only solution 
that seemed like it would achieve their goals, with the understanding that it needed to be broader than simply 
the major federal-level players or economic interests—that rights had to be a focus as well.36 
 
29 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Key Informant interview. (April 2014). 
34 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Atlantic Philanthropies. (2004, February 11). Grant Recommendation Rationale, App. 12601.  
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The advocates and Atlantic decided that Atlantic’s support for this coalition would be placed with a mediating 
entity, and that the mediating entity—rather than Atlantic—would determine where exactly the funds would be 
dispersed. This was unheard of. As one advocate recalled, “that was music to my ears. I’d never heard such a 
thing in my life. Most of us hadn’t. And we were thrilled!”37 The board of the campaign was structured to be 
small enough to act quickly but large enough to ensure balance in funding decisions. This Convening 
Committee was made up of ten organizations that were highly respected and competent in regards to 
immigration and immigrant issues in the US. 
 
Original Members of the CCIR Convening Committee 
Regional Organizations Leadership 
Piñeros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste (PCUN) 
Woodburn, OR 
www.pcun.org 
Then & Now: Ramon Ramirez 
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los 
Angeles (CHIRLA) 
Los Angeles, CA 
www.chirla.org 
Then & Now: Angelica Salas 
Illinois Coalition for Immigration and Refugee Rights 
(ICIRR) 
Chicago, IL 
www.icirr.org 
Then: Joshua Hoyt 
 
Now: Lawrence Benito 
 
Joshua Hoyt is now the Executive Director of the 
National Partnership for New Americans (the 
Partnership). 
New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC) 
New York, NY 
www.thenyic.org 
 
Then: Margie McHugh 
 
Now: Steven Choi 
 
Margie McHugh is now the Co-Director of the 
National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy at 
the Migration Policy Institute. 
 
  
 
37 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
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Original Members of the CCIR Convening Committee 
National Organizations Leadership 
National Immigration Forum (NIF) 
Washington, DC 
www.immigrationforum.org 
Leader then: Frank Sharry 
Leader now: Ali Noorani 
 
Frank Sharry is the founder and executive director of 
America’s Voice. 
National Council of La Raza (NCLR) 
Washington, DC 
www.nclr.org 
Then: Cecilia Muñoz 
Now: Charles Kamasaki 
 
Cecilia Muñoz is now the director of the White House 
Domestic Policy Council. 
Center for Community Change (CCC) 
Washington, DC 
www.communitychange.org 
Then & Now: Deepak Bhargava 
National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium 
(NAPALC) 
(now the Asian American Justice Center) 
Washington, DC 
www.advancingequality.org 
Then: Karen Narasaki 
 
Now: Mee Moua 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU) 
Washington, DC 
www.seiu.org 
Then: Eliseo Medina 
 
Now: Mary Kay Henry 
 
Eliseo Medina is now the secretary-treasurer of SEIU. 
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees 
International Union (UNITE HERE) 
New York, NY 
www.unitehere.org 
 
Throughout most of its participation in immigration 
reform, UNITE HERE was affiliated with the AFL-CIO. 
Then: Tom Snyder, Maria Elena Durazo 
 
Now: Maria Elena Durazo, David Glaser, and Tom 
Snyder 
 
Maria is General Vice President for Immigration, Civil 
Rights, and Diversity. David Glaser is Organizing 
Director. Tom Snyder is one of the International Vice 
Presidents. 
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With money from Atlantic, the Washington, D.C.-based Nueva Vista Group helped plan the structure of the 
campaign and guided it to have “an intense focus on message, voter mobilization and targeted grassroots 
activity.”38 From the start, CCIR was founded as a 501(c)(4) so that it could engage in the lobbying activities 
that made up over 80% of its 2004 campaign budget. This was also rather different from typical grantmaking 
in the US, where many funders face restrictions on the types of activities that their grants can support (i.e., 
lobbying and electoral engagement). Atlantic initially granted $3 million of CCIR’s $4.5 million budget for its 
first 18 months in operation, and early on CCIR formed a companion 501(c)(3) organization to raise funds from 
US-based foundations who were unable to or uneasy about making grants to a 501(c)(4) organization.39 The 
sudden influx of 501(c)(4) money into the immigration advocacy space contributed to the building of 501(c)(4) 
branches of organizations across the country, giving them access to a highly desirable pot of money.40 
Atlantic’s funding of this coalition was unique for another reason: they acknowledged that no windows of 
opportunity would be open for at least two years, with the first potential moment of change occurring no 
earlier than 2006. However, they believed that “now is the time to begin to put into place the tools, education 
and messages that will be used in the next three years to ensure that the eventual reform legislation best 
serves a key disadvantaged and vulnerable group in our society.”41 
Originally physically housed at the offices of UNITE HERE/AFL-CIO before moving over to the offices of the 
National Immigration Forum, CCIR worked on behalf of immigrants to advance national legislation 
incorporating six key principles for immigration reform: 
1. Reform must be comprehensive; 
2. Provide a path to citizenship; 
3. Protect workers; 
4. Reunite families; 
5. Restore the rule of law and enhance security; and 
6. Promote citizenship and civic participation and help local communities.42 
 
In their reflections on the work of the immigration reform field during the CCIR era, advocates recall engaging 
most in organizing/civic engagement and lobbying—through communications; issue and policy analysis; 
strengthening immigrant participation and leadership; rallies, actions, and civil disobedience; and fighting state 
and local battles to influence the federal fight were also widespread. That said, much of the work focused on 
inside-the-Beltway strategies.43 CCIR’s Board and Strategy Council grew in size to 25 national organizations 
and 17 state and local organizations totaling 42 organizations representing labor, faith communities, state-
based immigration coalitions, and others,44 though the movement was not very cohesive at this point in time. 
Grassroots and grasstops organizations were in the same room, but they were not quite speaking the same 
 
38 Atlantic Philanthropies. (2004, February 11). Grant Recommendation Rationale, App. 12601. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
41 Atlantic Philanthropies. (2004, February 11). Grant Recommendation Rationale, App. 12601. 
42 About Us. In Campaign for Comprehensive Immigration Reform. Retrieved from 
http://www.cirnow.org/content/en/about_us.htm. 
43 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
44 Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform Board and Strategy Council. In Campaign for 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CCIR.) Retrieved September 2011 from 
http://www.cirnow.org/content/en/about_ccir.htm. 
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language.45 The coalition was functional enough, however, to continue to receive funding from Atlantic, 
indicating that they demonstrated some level of cohesion, carried out intended actions, leveraged other 
sources of funding, and assessed whether strategic adjustments needed to be made in order to achieve 
comprehensive immigration reform by 2008.46 
There were other difficulties as well: the decisionmaking structure for allotting funding came under fire as 
groups within the coalition were thought to be trying to game the Board and gain control over the money. This 
led to a “near split” in 2006, at which time Atlantic made the decision to adjust the structure; The Advocacy 
Fund (TAF)47 would become the intermediary through which funding would flow.48 This shift improved basic 
functionality of the coalition dramatically, allowing member organizations to focus on immigration work moreso 
than power struggles for funding. 
While the coalition was facing their internal battles, there were very important, external, public battles being 
fought at this time on the immigration front. December 2005 saw the introduction and passage by the 109th 
House of H.R.4437, the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005. This bill 
is better known as the “Sensenbrenner bill” for James Sensenbrenner Jr., a Republican Representative from 
Wisconsin.49 It was a blow to the immigration reform movement as it was vehemently anti-immigrant in its 
content—and it signaled just how intense the fight would be. For example, the Sensenbrenner bill upgraded 
illegal entry into the US to a felony charge from a misdemeanor, and it proposed building a wall along at least 
700 miles of the US-Mexico border. However, it also served as a catalyst for broader pro-immigrant activities: 
the spring of 2006 saw historic pro-immigrant mass marches. Radio DJs helped fuel the movement, largely led 
by local, grassroots groups.50 
At this time CCIR saw the first opportunity window opening for comprehensive immigration reform in the 
form of a comprehensive immigration bill sponsored by Arlen Specter and known in circles as CIRA, the 
Hagel-Martinez compromise, the amnesty bill, or comprehensive immigration reform (S.2611, 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006). To the disappointment of CCIR and many in the pro-
immigration reform field, the bill passed the Senate but then stalled in the House.51 (Both S.2611 and S.1348 
did contain some measures that were challenged by part of the pro-immigration reform field—aspects of this 
legislation were seen by some as further criminalizing immigrants and containing unrealistic eligibility criteria.) 
The next opportunity window opened shortly thereafter, in May 2007, with the Comprehensive Reform Act of 
2007 (S.1348) in the 110th Congress.52 CCIR went on the offensive to move and improve this bill.53 It died in 
the Senate, which was an even bigger blow to CCIR and the field—and forced advocates to rethink their 
strategies attempting to effect comprehensive immigration reform. 
 
 
45 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
46 Atlantic Philanthropies. (2004, February 11). Grant Recommendation Rationale, App. 12601. 
47 The Advocacy Fund was formerly called the Tides Advocacy Fund. 
48 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
49 Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Legal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R.4437, 109th Cong. (2005). 
Retrieved from https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr4437. 
50 Innovation Network. (2007, June 15). Final Grant Report for Grant Application #13888; and Key Informant 
interview. (March 2014). 
51 Innovation Network. (2006, December 22). Interim Progress Report #3 for Grant Application #13888; And 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S.2611, 109th Cong. (2006). Retrieved from 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s2611. 
52 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S.1348, 110th Cong. (2007). Retrieved from 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/s1348. 
53 Innovation Network. (2007, June 15). Final Grant Report for Grant Application #13888. 
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Structural Changes in CCIR, 2004 to 2007 
 
CCIR evolved over its lifespan to adapt to changing needs internally and in the field. This information is 
adapted from the 2007 Innovation Network evaluation report to The Atlantic Philanthropies on the progress 
and changes in the campaign.54 
 
 
2004 
 
 
 
  
Organic Stage 
• CCIR received initial funding and established as a coalition in April 2004, but had no 
formal structure; 
• Initial structure attempted to separate the coalition (CCIR) from the legislative campaign 
NAOC (New American Opportunity Campaign), but this proved confusing and overlapping. 
 
2005 - 
2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 Enterprising Stage 
• In September 2005, CCIR underwent a structural change, formalized with 13-member 
board of directors; 
• Board-run campaign with small, 4-person staff and a campaign committee structure for 
legislative, field and media; 
• Sub-contracted to about 20 local organizations nationwide to conduct grassroots 
advocacy; 
• Worked with a small number of legislative and political consultants; 
• Survived several “moments of truth” in making hard decisions about campaign direction 
strategy that threatened to divide the coalition into factions; 
• Created We Are America Alliance as a vehicle for broader inclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
Intentional Stage 
• In December 2006, CCIR underwent formal restructuring that considerably broadened 
representation of different groups and sectors and, importantly, separated 
decisionmaking about strategy and funding allocations; 
• Hired a new campaign manager; 
• Nominated a smaller, six-person Board of Directors with proportional representation of 
DC national policy groups, local field groups, and labor groups responsible for funding 
and governance decisions; 
• Established a new 35-40 person Strategy Council that included the 13 sitting Board 
members and expanded to include strategic representation of key groups, including 
labor, religious groups, and a special push to recruit select African American-led groups; 
purpose of Strategy Council is to make joint decisions on strategy directions, advocacy 
priorities, and policy positions; 
• Established a Strategy Council Steering Committee comprised of 7 members, 3 from the 
Board of Directors and 4 from the Strategy Council who are not on the Board of Directors, 
 
54 Ibid. 
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and with equitable representation from different sectors, to facilitate integration between 
the two bodies, and serve as the nominating committee for the Strategy Council; 
• Changed policy to discontinue re-granting of funds to the field and instead to redirect 
those funds to campaign activities and operations; 
• Hired about a dozen professional progressive campaign consultants, including lobbyists 
and a communications firm, to ensure that lobbying, communications and grassroots 
efforts are channeled into and coordinated to move political targets. 
   
 
 
  
Advocacy, Politics, and Philanthropy: A Reflection on a Decade of Immigration Reform Advocacy 21 
Reform Immigration FOR America 
After the failure in 2007, morale sank pretty low among coalition members. The latest possibility for 
comprehensive immigration reform was a bill that did not even make it out of the Senate. The Atlantic 
Programme Officer recognized that a regrouping needed to happen. Atlantic invited about 15 key leaders from 
CCIR and provided meeting space at an independent location, asking the leaders to come together to discuss 
what had happened over the last push for reform. As one of these leaders recalled, “it was extremely helpful. 
Because we were able to [talk through] (a) What went wrong? (b) What’s missing? (c) What do we need to go 
forward?”55 The group had enough space from the defeat to be able to take a step back, breathe, and plan for 
the next effort. It was a special moment. “The fact they could regroup after that—they were crushed but took a 
few months and came back together asking, ‘this is what we did [and] didn’t do right, [what we] can do’—that 
recalibration has never happened before.”56 
Coming out of the meeting, these leaders came up with the basic structure of the next campaign, the “Four 
Pillars Campaign.” It would be focused on four areas, or pillars, around which individuals and organizations 
would orient their work. The pillars were Communications, Policy/Advocacy, Civic Engagement/Voter 
Registration, and Field Mobilization. 
The most predominant strategies that advocates recall engaging in during this time period neatly align with the 
four pillars: communications; lobbying; rallies, actions, and/or civil disobedience; and organizing and/or civic 
engagement. 
Partly because the CCIR message had been co-opted into meaning amnesty for immigrants, rather than its 
intended focus of earned legalization and family unification, the coalition renamed itself to develop a new 
brand: Reform Immigration FOR America (RI4A). 
Policy/Advocacy pillar. Early work of the Policy/Advocacy pillar was oriented around “do no harm”: attempting 
to make it until the 2008 elections with nothing happening on the legislative front. Even friendly legislators 
were laying low at this time—scared of acting or because they just were not sure how to help. 
Field Mobilization pillar. There were recognized gaps in the groups 
around RI4A’s decisionmaking table at the beginning as well. For 
example, faith-based organizations were unrepresented. Field 
Mobilization aimed to bring these influential groups into the fold, as 
well as building campaign infrastructure to respond more rapidly to the 
often negative developments in immigration reform.57 
Communications pillar. At the same time that RI4A received funding 
for the Field Mobilization and Policy/Advocacy pillars, Atlantic worked 
with Frank Sharry to transform CCIR into a new organization that would 
focus on the communications piece of the new strategy. 
Communications was an overarching issue that the campaign decided 
it needed to strengthen to effectively combat the negative, dominant 
discourse. CCIR was legally converted into America’s Voice, and its remaining $1 million was transferred to this 
new organization as seed money for its operations. One of the key takeaways from the 2007 defeat was that 
the anti-immigrant and anti-immigration communications machine was extremely strong, and pro-immigrant 
messages, while effective on a small scale, were not making their way into mainstream media or the 
 
55 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
56 Ibid. 
57 Innovation Network. (2008, May 31). Progress Report #2 for Grant Application #15600. 
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households of the general public. America’s Voice began to develop messaging that could be used across the 
campaign to give it a more coherent, unified voice in battling anti-immigrant sentiment. 
RI4A’s vision of comprehensive immigration reform was comprised of four parts:  
• An inclusive path to citizenship for those living in America without papers; 
• A reformed legal immigration system that is fair to families and assures family unity; 
• Worker protections that assure fair conditions for both native-born and immigrant workers; and 
• Fair enforcement that not only secures the borders but enforces labor, civil and human rights.58 
Those behind the planning for RI4A anticipated that the next opportunity for reform would be a 15-month 
period from April 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010.59 As with CCIR, the funding that RI4A received was unusual 
given the lack of an open policy window,60 which is often when funding appears. 
With then-Senator Obama’s election to the presidency, immigration reform returned to the federal agenda. 
After high-ranking Obama campaign officials promised to prioritize federal immigration reform legislation 
Atlantic and advocates increased investments and commitment. In addition to Obama’s support, the fact that 
both houses of Congress were controlled by Democratic legislators signaled the opening of a very promising 
opportunity window. Atlantic applied a lot of pressure in the field to concentrate funding within RI4A to lock in 
federal legislative change as the focus of immigration reform efforts. In spite of this push, other priorities also 
gained traction in the field. Between 2007 and 2010, the campaign for the DREAM Act began as a part of CCIR 
but began to take on a life of its own. 
This was a time of hope and promise. “Like almost every social justice field, when there was the anticipation of 
Obama and the first couple years of Obama, there was incredible prioritization of social justice that hadn’t 
happened before. The benefit of that was supporting immigrant-led groups.”61 
Civic engagement/Voter Registration pillar. Unfortunately, Obama’s first two years as President proved 
unrewarding for the comprehensive immigration reform movement. Tea Partiers were gaining power, the 
economy went into the deepest recession since the Great Depression, and President Obama was trying to 
move other major legislation through a deeply divided Congress, including an overhaul of the US healthcare 
system. Comprehensive immigration reform did not make it to the table, though it had been promised to the 
field by a top advisor to the President. In 2010, Atlantic made the decision to pull back from the campaign 
approach, which had not borne fruit. They stepped up their investments in civic engagement work, targeting 
several states and helping to build lists of people that could be used to activate people when needed for pro-
immigrant/pro-immigration activities, akin to the anti-immigrant/anti-immigration machine that the opposition 
had at their disposal. After watching immigration become a lower priority, advocates understood that political 
power would be necessary to hold both Democrats and Republicans accountable on the issue. Civic 
engagement work focused on registering more Latinos to vote and getting them to the polls, as well as 
studying what does and does not work in regards to Latino voter registration. The lists that Atlantic’s funding 
helped to build for RI4A became an enormous asset to the coalition, and to this day are its main legacy. 
 
58 Our Principles. In Reform Immigration FOR America. Retrieved September 2014 from 
http://reformimmigrationforamerica.org/about-us/our-principles.html. 
59 Tides Advocacy Fund. (2009, January 14). Grant Recommendation Rationale, App. 17203. 
60 A policy or opportunity window is an opening in the policy process that creates the possibility for advocates 
and others to influence the outcome of that process. See Kingdon, J. W. (1995). Agendas, alternatives, and 
public policies (2nd ed.). New York: Longman. 
61 Key Informant interview, March 2014. 
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In 2012, two major events happened that paved the way for the next phase of the campaign and movement. 
First, in June 2012 President Obama issued a policy directive that directed certain federal immigration 
enforcement agencies to exercise prosecutorial discretion toward individuals that meet certain criteria and do 
not have lawful immigration status. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA, took the culpability of 
being in the US without status off of individuals who had been brought to the US as children and had not 
been convicted of any major crimes. Immigrant youth-led organizations like United We Dream contributed 
heavy grassroots mobilization efforts to show support for administrative action and keep the pressure on 
through civil disobedience. After DACA was announced, the floodgates opened as children and young adults 
attempted to file the paperwork necessary to qualify under the policy directive. 
The second event was President Obama’s reelection campaign and landslide victory which saw significant 
turnout by the Latino population in the US. Earlier in 2012 Atlantic staff had consulted with a wide variety of 
immigration reform stakeholders (advocates, public officials, and academics) and had decided to make a 
sizeable, $3.9 million short-term investment to promote civic engagement among Latino voters and their allies. 
The investment was multifaceted, providing support for developing a Latino voter strategy, mobilizing voters 
across the US, deploying RI4A’s online grassroots organizing capacity to bring attention to the Latino vote, and 
developing a national media narrative linking the Latino vote to immigration reform. The goal of the timely cash 
infusion was to demonstrate the formidable Latino vote and to prove that the immigration reform field had 
mobilization power that could be brought to bear on federal immigration reform.62 This effort was thought to 
impact the Republican Party and cause it to take the issue of immigration more seriously. 
Atlantic and others were pleased with the outcome—in fact, the high turn-out of the Latino vote was a top story 
for many news outlets following President Obama’s reelection. One individual said that “that’s the best role 
Atlantic can play: to show politicians that the Latino vote has to be reckoned with.”63 And indeed, that was the 
outcome of the election as far as the immigration reform field was concerned. The turnout of the Latino 
population in the US was significant and sent a message to politicians across the country that immigrants are 
an important political faction. 
These events led to the next strategic rebranding of the coalition, transforming it from RI4A into a new 
machine. Though the name of the campaign changed, the RI4A brand lived on in the form of the extensive lists 
that had been built as part of RI4A’s online organizing capacity. As of December 2014, the RI4A lists add up to 
about 1.7 million SMS contacts, email addresses, social media accounts, and phone numbers. 
Alliance for Citizenship 
At the end of 2012, Atlantic and the Open Society Foundation co-convened a large group of funders (between 
30 and 40) to try to get everyone on board supporting a unified effort toward comprehensive immigration 
reform. Much of the renewed momentum was tied to an emerging recognition of the growing power of the 
Latino vote—and by extension, the need for immigration reform. The confluence of Obama’s landslide 
reelection victory and the strong Congressional, media, and popular support signaled the opening of a new, 
very promising opportunity window. At the convening, advocates were also in the room, and it was 
characterized as a “pretty successful” convening.64 In addition to this federal-level focus, funding was also 
directed toward state efforts, and specifically to Arizona, because of the notion that Arizona provides a test 
case to the rest of the country for what to do—and what not to do—around immigration reform at the state level. 
 
62 Atlantic Philanthropies. (2012, December 19). Proposed U.S. 2013-2014 Protecting Immigrants’ Rights 
Strategy. 
63 Key Informant interview. (April 2014). 
64 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
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The new formulation of the comprehensive immigration reform coalition was intended to be an “intense, short-
term (six to twelve month) legislative and administrative campaign to be led by a newly formed coalition called 
the Alliance for Citizenship (A4C). The proposed grant to The Advocacy Fund, the fiscal agent for A4C, would 
support a national mobilization effort to pass immigration reform that secures a pathway to permanent 
legalization, safeguard family unity, protect the rights of all workers, and support immigrant integration.”65 A4C 
coordinates the activities across the field in terms of pace, direction, messaging, and guiding legislative and 
policy work for the immigration reform field. 
Importantly, like the other campaigns, it also serves as a conduit for funding from Atlantic and other funders. 
Initially, an Atlantic grant of $1.7 million was made to the campaign in 
January 2013, matched by the Open Society Foundation; this was 
added to approximately $1 million in leftover funds from RI4A. A4C 
planned to focus on work similar to the four pillars of RI4A, adding 
organizing support from conservative faith, law enforcement, and 
business leaders with the goal of gaining support from elected leaders 
with ties to those groups. An additional $1.8 million was authorized to 
the campaign, the headline of the recommendation being “with the 
2014 election cycle approaching, immigration reform must happen 
this year to be successful. While momentum is strong, hurdles remain 
in the Senate and the staunchly partisan House.”66 
Atlantic made a bold funding move: they announced that this $3.5 
million in funding would be a match. This ruffled some feathers. 
Funders felt obliged to donate to the campaign, as not funding was 
perceived by some as carrying the risk of being labeled not pro-
immigrant. For others, the match challenge put pressure on funders to 
reexamine their strategies. The match was very successful and ended 
up raising far more than the $3.5 million required to release the funds to the campaign. 
Some advocates felt that A4C was an improvement over previous rounds of the campaign. “It has taken us a 
while to get the right formula. I think we’re much closer this round, but we learned the hard way.”67 One asset 
of the campaign is its nimbleness. Decisions don’t need member approval, and so the campaign can pivot 
more quickly than in previous iterations. In this way, it is also good at public relations and messaging, as it can 
quickly respond to new developments in the field, particularly through collaboration with America’s Voice. It’s 
important to remember, however, that this work cannot only be public relations. There is also the political side 
to the campaign: “If you believe the Republican Party is critical to the outcome, and you don’t have a 
Republican strategy, then you don’t have a strategy.”68 
A4C also reflected an acknowledgement that the immigrant rights movement had substantially grown and 
matured since CCIR. The field was larger, benefitting from capacity building work during CCIR and especially 
RI4A which had seeded a multitude of new immigration organizations across the country. The field was more 
complex at both the grasstops and grassroots. Leadership was more diverse, and the complexity of securing 
reform even more so. The campaign reflected these changes and the differing opinions, and exhibited strength 
in its ability to hold diverse views and yet move forward. An example of this maturity is that in the debate 
around S.744 (the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act), the border 
 
65 Tides Advocacy Fund. (January 2013). Grant Recommendation Rationale, App. 22135.  
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groups continued to support S.744 and work with other advocates though they strongly opposed the Corker-
Hoeven amendment that had been introduced (that would have added billions of dollars to enforcement). 
While trust had increased, tensions remained; divisions remained between advocates calling for piecemeal 
solutions and those calling for comprehensive immigration reform. Divisions also remained between grassroots 
groups and A4C (a persistent finding from earlier campaign evaluations and key informant interview data): “I 
think there is good intentionality on both sides [to collaborate effectively]. I don’t think it’s the inside-the-
Beltway groups wanting to keep people out, but the nature of [policy deals] is behind closed doors…and you 
can’t have everyone at the table.”69 
The big break for A4C came in mid-2013, when the “Gang of Eight,” a bipartisan group of Senators led by 
Senator Chuck Schumer of New York, drafted S.744, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and 
Immigration Modernization Act. The bill was very comprehensive and landmark in its ability to garner 
Democratic votes—all Democratic Senators voted for the bill. In addition, fourteen Republicans voted for S.744, 
leading to a final vote tally of 68 to 32. However the House, which differs dramatically in its makeup and in its 
ability to work across the aisle, was not able to pass the legislation. Three potential factors have been cited for 
the House’s inability to support the legislation: strong hostility toward the Obama Administration, growing 
anxiety over domestic demographic changes, and Republicans embattled in their districts due to redistricting. 
Regardless of cause, the House was unable to secure enough votes. 
The Alliance for Citizenship represents the national coalition that coordinates the efforts of the pro-immigrant 
grassroots, legal, communication, policy, and labor organizations. It represents one of three essential parts of 
the immigrant rights/immigration reform movement. Approximately 40 national organizations play a large 
role—participating in A4C and carrying out their own efforts in support of immigration reform. Local and state 
organizations and coalitions also play a role, especially in executing the strategies and growing grassroots 
support. Today there are nearly 30 regional immigrant rights organizations that are the backbone of the 
immigration reform movement, many of them grown over the past decade by regional leaders such as CHIRLA, 
ICIRR, NYIC, and CASA de Maryland. 
Though President Obama took executive action in November 2014 to ease the threat of deportation for 4 
million to 6 million undocumented immigrants, the US immigration system is far from resolved. Some fear 
increased scrutiny for the approximately 7 million undocumented immigrants living within the US who are not 
eligible for DACA or DAPA. Federal policy change is still necessary to bring about a long-term, durable solution 
for undocumented immigrants living within the US. Depending on the source, the next opportunity window for 
federal immigration policy change may be in 2017 (after the 2016 presidential election), or 2020 (after a few 
rounds of electoral politics). There will be a continued need for campaigns such as A4C and advocates across 
the US to advance protections for immigrants within the US. 
Ten Years of Immigration Reform Campaigns 
On the issue of immigration reform, advocates have sought to move a wide variety of audiences. Focusing only 
on federal immigration policy change, examples of target audiences include the more than 220 million voting-
eligible citizens of the general public, the approximately 11 million undocumented immigrants living within the 
US, the business community, the faith community, police departments, labor union leaders and members, the 
US Department of Homeland Security, 635 Senators and Representatives of the US Congress, and the 
President of the United States. 
 
69 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
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Prior to Atlantic’s support of CCIR in 2004 it had been 
some time since there had been a credible, likely policy 
for federal immigration reform. The last major policy 
change had been the passage of IIRIRA in 1996 and 
before that IRCA in 1986. There had been opportunities 
for immigration reform advocacy between 1996 and 
2004, but not of the size and likelihood sufficient to 
galvanize a grassroots to grasstops, nationwide 
campaign and policy fight. In 2004, proponents of 
immigration reform were confronted with a choice: they 
could continue with the path they had been on for the 
past eight years of mostly small-scale, policy advocacy, or 
they could reconstitute the field to create a strong, 
unifying campaign body to amplify the debate and 
catalyze opportunity windows. Atlantic and CCIR chose 
the latter, and by doing so, created a campaign and a 
field of advocates that were no longer waiting for a policy 
window for immigration reform but were creating the 
urgency and focus necessary to unite and inspire the 
field. 
A policy or opportunity window is an opening in the policy process that creates the possibility for advocates and 
others to influence the outcome of that process.70 Without a policy window, it is difficult, if not impossible, for 
advocates to have influence on their issues of interest. Policy windows open infrequently. Their opening may be 
caused by factors such as a focusing event that directs attention to an issue that may be remedied by 
legislation, a reauthorization of an existing policy, or the re-emergence of a policy proposal that has yet to 
secure enough support for passage. Absent an open policy window, most independent advocacy organizations 
lack the power to propel their issue to the forefront of the public policy agenda. 
Traditionally, advocacy organizations ramp up their efforts when a policy window opens. For example, the 
recent passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 opened the door for many 
health advocates to advance their issues, such as remedying issues of health equity through the provisions 
and implementation of ACA. In the case of immigration reform, Atlantic and the founding members of CCIR 
were not content to wait for a policy window to materialize. Rather, they chose to create a campaign with a 
singular policy objective which galvanized a field into coordinated action which attracted the action and 
support of advocates that previously did not exist. And because the 501(c)(4) funding could be used to ramp 
up political pressure, the campaign captured the attention and respect of politicians (perhaps in the Senate 
more so than in the House). It was these actions that led to the opening of the policy windows in Congress. 
The campaign’s 501(c)(4) designation and 501(c)(4) funds were crucial to the success of this strategy. With 
501(c)(4) funds, organizations can be engaged in the political and electoral processes. Advocates who have 
access to these funds describe the feeling of having a complete toolkit or being able to engage with the 
opposition on equal footing. The campaigns (CCIR, RI4A, and A4C) have used their 501(c)(4) designations to 
bolster pro-immigration reform and threaten anti-immigration reform candidates and electoral issues (e.g., 
ballot initiatives), most notably in the 2010 presidential and 2012 midterm elections. The added flexibility and 
muscle engendered by a 501(c)(4) structure would prove critical to the ensuing fight as the issue of 
immigration quickly morphed from policy to politics and elections became a key battleground.  
 
70 Kingdon, J. W. (1995). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies (2nd ed.). New York: Longman. 
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While lobbying has been the go-to strategy of the immigration reform campaigns to create and maintain legislator 
support for the past decade, the campaigns have also pursued multiple avenues for attracting and activating public 
support, including community organizing; communications; and rallies, actions, and civil disobedience. All three of 
these public-focused strategies have seen an uptick in popularity in the past decade, especially after Congress’ 
inability to pass comprehensive immigration reform legislation in June 2007 and in the transition from CCIR to 
RI4A. 
Looking across the strategies and their use from CCIR to RI4A to A4C, grassroots strategies were increasingly 
used while grasstops strategies declined in use. With Atlantic’s entry into the immigration reform field and its 
initial support to CCIR, the fight for comprehensive immigration reform was conceptualized as a policy 
battle—a federal policy fight waged with a grasstops strategy. As the field grew in experience it moved away 
from its initial conceptions and evolved to focus more on engaging and activating the public to create a 
powerful, national movement with enough momentum to sustain pressure on Congress to get the job done. 
The move from focusing on grasstops to grassroots signaled a growing realization within the field that to 
impact policy it must impact politics. CCIR was established as a 501(c)(4) organization primarily for the 
purpose of engaging in lobbying and also to keep all strategy doors open. Though it was a 501(c)(4), in CCIR’s 
early days the campaign did not heavily pursue civic engagement, voter 
registration, voter mobilization, community organizing, and other forms of 
electoral engagement. But after the Senate failed in June 2007 to pass 
the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (S.1348), the reflection and 
learning conversations sponsored by Atlantic led RI4A to focus much of its 
energy on electoral strategies to bring the field fully into political fights. 
RI4A saw this tactic as an avenue to gain more leverage over policy. 
The first few months of RI4A coincided with the run-up to the 2008 
Presidential elections. Coming out of the June 2007 defeat, the 
campaign’s analysis was that the Right failed to deliver enough votes in 
support of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (S.1348)—delivering only 12 out of the 25 to 30 votes 
necessary to secure the filibuster-proof margin of 60 votes.71 Unsurprisingly, campaign leaders did not then 
pursue a closer relationship with the Right and became closer with the Left as the 2008 Presidential elections 
grew nearer. Furthermore, a high-ranking campaign official within the Barack Obama campaign let it be known 
that if Senator Obama were elected as the next President of the United States, he would use his leverage to 
secure the passage of a comprehensive immigration reform policy within the first nine months of his first term. 
Senator Obama himself included a nod to immigration reform in his 2008 address at the Democratic National 
Convention in Denver accepting the Democratic nomination: “You know, passions may fly on immigration, but I 
don't know anyone who benefits when a mother is separated from her infant child or an employer undercuts 
American wages by hiring illegal workers.”72 
This political opening moved the immigration reform field, RI4A, and America’s Voice into closer alignment with 
Progressives and the Democratic Party. The timing of Atlantic’s grantmaking and advocates’ activity levels 
attest to their political involvement: times of high activity are evident in the lead up to the 2008 Presidential 
election, the 2010 midterm election, and the 2012 Presidential election. Across the country immigration 
reform advocates who had the ability to do so aligned their work to support local, state, and federal pro-
immigration reform candidates. For the most part, those candidates were Democrats. This change is 
important. It signals a shift from the founding principal of the campaign to be a non-partisan entity to a new 
 
71 Atlantic Philanthropies. (n.d.). Final report for Atlantic GRS 15597. 
72 Barack Obama’s Acceptance Speech. (2008, August 28). In New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/us/politics/28text-obama.html. 
“I don't know anyone who 
benefits when a mother is 
separated from her infant 
child or an employer 
undercuts American wages 
by hiring illegal workers.” 
Advocacy, Politics, and Philanthropy: A Reflection on a Decade of Immigration Reform Advocacy 30 
type of advocacy machine rooted in politics to build the necessary power to enable policy change. It also 
marked a deepened reliance on the part of Atlantic and pro-immigration reform advocates on the Democratic 
Party—an investment that has yet to deliver on comprehensive immigration reform. 
A counterpoint to this dynamic is the political strategy of the immigrant reform advocates who were responsible 
for DACA. Though DACA was advanced by President Obama’s administration, Marco Rubio, a Republican 
Senator from Florida, is credited with playing a determining role in the policy directive. In mid-2012, Senator 
Rubio contacted a few vocal DREAMers to discuss his plans for an immigration reform bill. Around the same 
time, Administration officials ramped up their efforts to maintain the support of immigration reform advocates 
by advancing a DREAM Act alternative. The heat was on; President Obama’s administration needed to get in 
front of Senator Rubio if they were to continue to court the immigrant—mostly Latino—vote. 
The lesson of DACA is one of flexible strategy. The broader immigration reform movement is engaged in 
politics, but largely as a complement to the Democratic Party. For the past three election cycles (the past six 
years), the Democratic Party has benefitted from the promise of immigration reform. Millions of dollars have 
gone to support immigration reform activists battling mostly Republican candidates and ballot initiatives that 
threaten comprehensive immigration reform. DREAMers took a different approach: they sought first and 
foremost the advancement of their issue through political leverage and refused to be beholden to one political 
party. DREAMer leaders such as Gaby Pacheco met with both Senator Rubio and the President’s staff, 
simultaneously pursuing all avenues. This resulted in a relatively swift decision to advance the policy directive, 
DACA, granting relief for approximately 900,000 eligible young people. 
A second political strategy lesson is the need to put pressure on decisionmakers simultaneously through the 
grassroots (demonstrations, mobilizations, and elections) and through the grasstops (influentials, opinion 
leaders, and elites). Atlantic contributed some funds to address detention and deportation, and in doing so, 
provided grassroots support through a grant to National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON) and 
grasstops support through grants to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Heartland Alliance. In this 
example and others, it is thought that the grassroots pressure from below and the grasstops pressure from the 
top created the necessary political cover that decisionmakers—even allies—needed to make concessions. 
Deepak Bhargava, Executive Director of the Center for Community Change and long-time immigration reform 
advocate, relayed this same sentiment from President Obama himself in a meeting in March 2010 speaking 
about the prospects of immigration reform.73 
The communications strategy embedded within the three campaigns supported by Atlantic was elevated to a 
position of prominence in the transition from CCIR to RI4A. During CCIR, communications was one of many 
functions performed by the Coalition, members, or consultants. In the campaign’s learning from past efforts 
and transition to RI4A, leaders decided to invest more heavily in communications. CCIR (which, again, was 
structured as a 501(c)(4)) was revamped and legally converted to a new 501(c)(4) organization, America’s 
Voice. America’s Voice was created to “provide the field with communications leadership” and to play a 
coordinating role for not only the field’s communications work but to augment the work of the other three 
pillars (Policy/Advocacy, Civic Engagement/Voter Registration, and Field Mobilization), through 
communications support.74 
The campaign had fought hard on the communications front in the three years leading up to the formation of 
America’s Voice. The CCIR era was marked by hostile anti-immigrant sentiment, such as the Send-A-Brick 
campaign in April through May 2006, when more than 15,000 bricks were mailed to Congressional offices to 
 
73 Bhargava, Deepak. (January 2015). From Grassroots to Executive Action: Reflections on Immigration 
Reform. Responsive Philanthropy. Retrieved from http://www.ncrp.org/files/rp-articles/RP_Winter14-
15_Bhargava.pdf. 
74 Atlantic Philanthropies. (June 2008). Atlantic GRS 16635. 
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symbolize the need for a wall along the US–Mexico border to stem the tide of illegal border crossings.75 Anti-
immigrant sentiment was a mainstay in the mainstream media; almost nightly from 2006 to 2009 Lou Dobbs, 
in his show “Lou Dobbs Tonight,” then on CNN, lambasted “illegal aliens.” He warned the US public that 
immigrants were “foot soldiers sent by the Mexican government to ‘re-conquer’ the Southwest,” and that they 
“import[ed] deadly diseases, rampant crime and international terrorism; they live[d] off welfare, [and] 
destroy[ed] public schools and burden[ed] hospitals.”76 (Presente and its partners were eventually able to get 
Lou Dobbs off the air in their Basta Dobbs campaign.) 
Because of these influential, vocal opponents, immigration reform advocates felt a distinct need to increase 
their own communications and messaging capacities. Once America’s Voice was created, pro-immigration 
reform communications took off. The creation of an entity with the sole purpose of communications enabled 
the field to stop playing catch-up and get ahead on messaging. An “us versus them” scorecard was developed 
to track the relative market share of pro-immigration and anti-immigration media. And messaging was able to 
move from primarily defensive to offensive—a first for the field since pre-9/11. 
This move from defense to offense signaled the beginning of an era in which pro-immigrant messaging was 
able to beat back anti-immigrant messaging, becoming more mainstream. In 2009, after much pressure from 
pro-immigration advocates and others, Lou Dobbs stepped down from his show and was released from his 
CNN contract, bringing an end to three years of nightly haranguing of immigrants. Today it is almost hard to 
believe the degree of anti-immigrant fervor and vitriol that was commonplace only a few short years ago. 
America’s Voice and the field of immigration reform advocates transformed what was a very hostile 
environment into a public discourse with the space for the human rights of immigrants to be respected and 
the value of immigrants to be acknowledged.  
 
75 Kemper, Bob. (2006, June 21). Stuffing the mailbox of Congress. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Retrieval 
of http://www.ajc.com/news/content/living/stories/0621lvcongress.html made possible by the Internet 
Wayback Machine to June 24, 2009 
http://web.archive.org/web/20090624141313/http://www.ajc.com/news/content/living/stories/0621lvcon
gress.html. 
76 Eviatar, Daphne. (2006, August 28). Nightly Nativism. The Nation. Retrieved from: 
http://www.thenation.com/article/nightly-nativism. 
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Atlantic’s Grantmaking to Campaigns and Organizations, 2004 to 2014 
 
From 2004 to 2014 Atlantic directed $70.3 million toward US federal immigration policy reform. Of that total, 
$20.5 million was directed to the three campaigns: 
• Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform: $10 million 
• Reform Immigration FOR America: $5 million 
• Alliance for Citizenship: $5.5 million 
 
The three campaigns reallocated their Atlantic funds to other individuals and organizations: 
• Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform: $783,781 or 8% 
• Reform Immigration FOR America: $325,000 or 7% 
• Alliance for Citizenship: $5,004,153 or 91% 
 
In addition to funding campaigns, Atlantic also invested directly in organizations over the past decade. Some 
$49.8 million of the $70.3 million (71%) was directed to other organizations. 
Source: Atlantic Philanthropies’ grant documentation. 
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Atlantic, like other funders, was committed to building capacity in the field but sought to do so in a way that 
would not create a sustainability struggle when Atlantic eventually exited the field—as it knew that it would. 
Funding of campaigns was seen as a way to add money and therefore capacity to the field, but in a way that 
did not directly create organizational dependencies on the Foundation’s grant funds. In practice, though, a 
number of organizations did come to depend on Atlantic’s grant funds—especially 501(c)(4) organizations. It is 
arguable that some 501(c)(4) organizations such as America’s Voice would not exist without Atlantic. And as 
Atlantic’s grantmaking has wound down, grantees have scrambled to cobble together sufficient funds to 
continue even a portion of their work. Time will tell how many organizations will remain in the field to fight—
especially in light of how long it might be until the next comprehensive immigration reform policy opportunity. 
An enduring legacy of these three campaigns and ten years of Atlantic resources is that advocates have 
heightened expectations of what good advocacy looks like. They have learned how to work together, and are on 
a trajectory of increasingly sophisticated, coordinated, and impactful advocacy at the local, state, and national 
levels. 
In its dealings with the campaigns, Atlantic was very engaged in developing its own understanding of the issue 
landscape and opportunities, but was more hands off than a typical grantmaker when it came to the 
campaign’s tactical and operational decisionmaking. For example, Atlantic put incredible power in the hands 
of campaign members to decide how to allocate significant 
grant dollars. In other ways, Atlantic program officers were 
more hands on than a typical funder; program officers were 
instrumental in selecting the focus on comprehensive 
immigration reform and participated frequently in strategy 
calls (especially during intense times). Overall, Atlantic’s role 
relative to the immigration reform field could be characterized 
as selecting the goal and the players and then trusting the 
players to play their best game and win the day. Atlantic staff 
stayed in the loop with advocates and questioned and 
challenged their decisions. Atlantic saw its role as amplifying 
and enlarging advocates’ efforts. 
Within the grantmaking community, Atlantic’s entrance to the 
immigration field attracted the attention of other funders. The 
influx of Atlantic dollars was perceived as an enticement to other funders to enter a field that was increasingly 
well resourced and well poised for success. Atlantic’s substantial funding of the campaign allowed other 
funders greater flexibility in responding to immediate opportunity and also long-term capacity building. 
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Evolutions in the Field of Immigration Reform 
Advocacy 
Over the course of the past decade there have been many changes to the field of immigration reform. Atlantic 
shifted the field of immigration reform to focus on a federal legislative policy change to provide a path to 
citizenship to as many undocumented immigrants as possible. Atlantic’s investment strategy deeply affected 
the shaping of the field by affecting how people understand what immigration reform policy would look like and 
by acting as a magnet for foundations to invest in immigration reform. Its long-term investment lens of a 
federal legislative strategy was criticized by some as contributing to the de-prioritization of other strategies—
strategies that might have brought relief for some people more quickly. Critics argue that partial policy fixes 
and increased executive and judicial advocacy may have addressed some of the most pressing human rights 
aspects for immigrants more quickly. Atlantic’s match and infusion of funding into the field helped add fuel to 
the fight when it was needed, particularly in 2013. Many interviewees indicated that Atlantic’s exit will leave a 
large funding gap for campaigns and advocacy organizations, particularly those engaged in 501(c)(4) 
activities. 
While the end goal of comprehensive immigration reform has not been met, the overall paradigm of reform has 
shifted over the past decade and notable progress has been made. There has been a favorable change in 
public discourse, power with federal legislators has increased, there have been wins with the federal 
administrative branch, and the visibility of the movement has increased. As described by one individual, “the 
civil rights bill [Civil Rights Act of 1964] didn’t happen overnight. We continue to build movement and find ways 
to strengthen the infrastructure of the movement. The way you…measure success in the social justice world is 
very different from funding bricks and mortar.”77 Some of the most notable changes within the field of 
immigration reform are further discussed herein. 
Strategic Litigation 
In the context of immigration reform, strategic litigation is an area that is not given a great deal of public 
attention. This is because much of the strategic litigation that occurred in relation to immigration reform was 
done behind the scenes. Despite (or possibly due to) the lack of media attention, important victories have been 
made in the area of strategic litigation. Most notably, wins have been made by the Heartland Alliance’s 
National Immigrant Justice Center, ACLU’s Immigrants’ Rights Project, American Immigration Lawyers 
Association (AILA), National Immigration Law Center (NILC), and others. 
Attorneys working with these organizations and others have won significant legal battles that protect 
immigrants’ rights on both the state and federal level. For example, there have been several victories related to 
blocking anti-immigrant legislation in states such as Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, and Utah.78 In addition, these 
organizations and others were able to increase federal funding for legal orientation programs for 48,000 
detained immigrants and succeeded in getting the federal government to lift the HIV bar for immigrants in 
2009.79 Organizations also provided a great deal of support and guidance to immigrants by providing 
information regarding their right to due process. 
 
77 Key Informant interview. (March 2014). 
78 Litigation. In National Immigration Law Center. Retrieved from http://www.nilc.org/litigation.html. 
79 Legal Protections (PDF file]. (June 2009). In Heartland Alliance. Retrieved from 
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Civic Engagement  
The role of civic engagement in comprehensive immigration reform efforts cannot be understated. In the 
context of the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, civic engagement of key groups drastically impacted the 
outcomes. The record high voter turnout among Latinos in the 2012 election was particularly influential in 
securing President Barack Obama’s victory, with 71% of Latinos voting in support of President Obama and 27% 
in favor of Mitt Romney.80 In other ways, civic engagement among pro-immigration groups changed the frame 
of discussion around immigration reform. For example, the civic activism demonstrated by the DREAMers has 
drawn public attention and mobilized immigrant voter turnout. In part, this increase in civic engagement can be 
attributed to Atlantic and others’ investment in civic engagement as one of their Four Pillars during their 
reorganization in early 2008, and immigration reform advocates carried it forward at that time. Atlantic ramped 
up civic engagement funding in 2010 when there were no clear legislative windows of opportunity, and then 
kept up this funding while simultaneously diversifying their strategies in the run-up to the 2012 presidential 
election. Indeed, the success of this civic engagement work helped show politicians and the country at large 
that the Latino vote is a force to be reckoned with. 
Growth and Diversification of Allies 
Over time, a deeper bench of institutional allies has surfaced, representing a growth and diversification of 
allies. This diversification can be seen in the increased representation across a broad spectrum of political 
affiliations, although some would argue that immigration reform continues to be a Left-led movement. During 
the RI4A campaign, there was a staffed, campaign-initiated outreach plan targeting a wide variety of 
communities: faith, African-American, business, and labor, for example. Having a deeper bench of allies has 
also led to increased field capacity. This increased capacity has played out in a number of ways, including 
gaining support from law enforcement, faith-based organizations, and women-led groups, to name a few.  
 
80 Taylor, Paul and Mark Hugo Lopez. (2012, November 7). Latino Voters in the 2012 Election. Retrieved from 
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Leadership 
Leadership and decisionmaking is perceived as remaining stable within the immigration reform field over the 
past decade. A small set of leaders has largely stayed in place over the past ten years: 
• Frank Sharry, Founder and Director, America’s Voice 
• Deepak Bhargava, Executive Director, Center for Community Change 
• Angela Kelley, Vice President, Immigration Policy, Center for American Progress81 
• Ali Noorani, Executive Director, National Immigration Forum 
Regional leadership also remained steady in this period. Regional leaders such as Ramon Ramirez (President 
of PCUN and co-founder of Causa), Josh Hoyt (former Executive Director of ICIRR and now Executive Director of 
the National Partnership for New Americans), Gustavo Torres (Executive Director of CASA de Maryland), and 
Angelica Salas (Director of CHIRLA) fulfilled critical roles in leading regional organizations to carry out much of 
the on-the-ground work of the campaigns. 
This leadership was appreciated by some for the stability it 
provided, but criticized by others for stymieing the 
development of new and diverse leaders. Stability has been 
an asset, providing consistent guidance and recognized 
leadership. 
There has been some growth in new leaders, especially 
among immigrants and organizations working with 
immigrants. The growth of the movement in the past few 
years has surfaced new leaders or strengthened existing 
leaders such as Gaby Pacheco (The Bridge Project), 
Marielena Hincapié (NILC), Cristina Jiménez (UWD), Eliseo 
Medina (SEIU), and Janet Murguía and Clarissa Martínez-
De-Castro (NCLR). 
Many individuals consulted in the course of this project 
pointed to grassroots movement building as the most 
significant change in immigration reform over the past 
decade. “The growth of a very robust field structure that includes state-based coalitions, faith-based groups, 
non-immigrant allies, LGBT, African-American allies, [and] labor allies” has been “the most important 
development in the last 10 years…the whole ecosystem has become incredibly fertile, and rich, and that web 
of groups who are out there in every community have made the biggest difference in terms of being able to 
mobilize calls.”82 
Grassroots advocates and organizations were seen as making some of the biggest strides in the past 
decade—while the Washington, DC policy advocacy groups by comparison were thought to only moderately 
improve their clout.83 The changes among individuals and organizations has resulted in “more communication 
with the field, more communications capacity, better polling and data, and also ability to work with allies,” 
 
81 Ms. Kelley left the Center for American Progress in November 2014 to be on leave to the White House to 
help coordinate external outreach and public engagement around President Barack Obama’s Immigration 
Executive Actions. 
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compared to ten years ago when there were “pronounced weaknesses in terms of the field infrastructure and 
there were significant working barriers between the field and nationals.” Now, with the improvements in 
capacity and experience being in intense collaborative efforts, “it’s like one field now, and it’s healthy in the 
sense that it’s not all centrally driven.”84 
The field has made progress in building its skills and power, but it isn’t there yet. As a result of a range of 
factors—increased funding generally in the field of immigration reform, campaigns that raised the bar on 
expectations and quality for strategies, and a multiyear fight that tested advocates’ mettle—advocates 
developed a broader, deeper skill set. The field is achieving a state of development in which there are “people 
doing pretty much everything on the whole spectrum of advocacy strategies.” This has resulted in “a robust 
system where many state and local advocates are all doing what they’re 
good at, and it adds up to a very big, united front of pro-immigrant 
advocacy.”85 Many advocates agree that the field is stronger,86 but 
others caution that movement building has not yet yielded the necessary 
power to lead to influence with federal legislators.87 
Grassroots and movement organizations. Several organizations were 
called out for their contributions to grassroots and movement building 
efforts: Black Immigration Network, the Bridge Project, CAMBIO, CHIRLA, 
DreamActivists, The California Dream Network, the FIRM Network and its 
member organizations, ICIRR, NALACC, Detention Watch Network, National Immigrant Youth Alliance, NDLON, 
NILC, the Rights Working Group, the Southern Border Communities Coalition, United We Dream, and We 
Belong Together.88 
Important Role of DREAMers and DREAMer Organizations 
DREAMers are young, undocumented immigrants that have championed new vehicles for community 
organizing—through the internet, listservs, and campuses—drawing support from connected young people. 
DREAMers, United We Dream (UWD), and the more than 50 UWD affiliates have played an integral role in 
vocally advocating for immigration reform, especially since the mid 2000s (UWD was founded in 2008). Shortly 
after the failure to pass the DREAM Act in 2010, this group of activists started to increase in visibility. “Around 
this time is when you saw DREAMers coming out and sharing their stories and creating public accountability to 
the face of immigration reform.”"# Key DREAMers have also been credited with working with Senator Marco 
Rubio to pressure the White House leading up to the DACA decision in June 2012.#$ 
Another interviewee described the evolution of the DREAMers: “I witnessed going from a period of when people 
barely know what a DREAMer was to seeing [them] on the front page of Time Magazine. The Trail of Dreams 
[2010] symbolized that pivot. It was an action that was not about congressional legislation. It was around 
executive action two years before they were granted DACA. And it was a frame of ‘undocumented and 
unafraid’—we’re coming out publicly. So I feel like that is field creativity and also the narrative and strategy that 
got changed.”#% While the Trail of Dreams was very visible, it was far from the only action immigrant youth were 
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pursuing. United We Dream and DREAMers were busy ramping up the pressure on decisionmakers—and the 
immigration reform campaigns—through ongoing mobilizations and civil disobedience. 
The rise and success of the DREAMers illustrates one of the tensions within the field of immigration reform. 
The campaigns supported by Atlantic were focused primarily on federal legislative change. All strategies falling 
outside of that platform were viewed as a distraction. Proponents of comprehensive immigration reform were 
not interested in partial solutions for subsets of the 11 million undocumented immigrants. These advocates 
and supporting funders viewed stopping short of comprehensive immigration reform as a failure. As a result 
the central campaign remained focused on comprehensive immigration reform and was faulted by many as 
pivoting too late to support the DREAMers. “The DREAMers won the largest administrative relief given to 
undocumented immigrants to-date in DACA [June 2012]. And now that [comprehensive] immigration reform 
looks unlikely, the central campaign for immigration reform is supporting administrative advocacy for 
administrative relief.”92 
Comprehensive immigration reform campaigns and related efforts that preceded the DREAMers did contribute 
mightily to what DREAMers were able to accomplish. Earlier phases of the fight had weakened anti-immigrant 
sentiment, improved some aspects of detention and deportation, developed communications and outreach 
pathways into immigrant communities, and built consciousness and power in immigrant communities. The 
impact of comprehensive immigration reform advocates and DREAMers is impossible to disentangle; the 
success of DREAMers similarly contributed to the broader movement, augmenting the energy and numbers of 
the grassroots movement. The impact of young immigration reform advocates can further be seen in the 
decision by the central campaign for immigration reform to be flexible on comprehensive immigration reform to 
embrace the President’s November 2014 Executive Action on immigration (DAPA). The battle and success of 
DACA paved the way for a much broader reform that may otherwise not have come to fruition. 
Important Role of Immigrant Advocates 
The past ten years have coincided with an increase in immigrant advocates within the immigration reform 
movement. NDLON’s Not One More campaign, the FIRM Network’s Keeping Families Together campaign, and 
the efforts of United We Dream illustrate the rise of immigrant-led advocacy. Immigrant advocates fulfilled a 
crucial need to humanize the issue and make the impact of the harsh immigration enforcement a relatable, 
human story. These advances were identified as contributing to the success of DACA and DAPA as well as 
successes at the state and local level. 
Atlantic’s 501(c)(4) Funding 
501(c)(4) funding enabled organizations to be engaged in political and electoral processes with the capacity to 
impact immigration reform. The bulk of the $70.3 million to support the immigration legislative reform work, 
including campaigns initiated by CCIR, RI4A, and A4C, came from The Atlantic Advocacy Fund (AAF), which, as 
noted earlier in the report, is a 501(c)(4) social welfare organization created in 2007 by a US subsidiary of The 
Atlantic Philanthropies. As a 501(c)(4), AAF is able to make grants that enable other social welfare 
organizations to more fully engage in the political process, including undertaking activities such as educating 
legislators and the public on issues related to their missions and expressing support for or in opposition to 
legislative proposals. Although AAF did not permit its grants to be used for partisan activities, the funds it 
awarded for immigration reform provided greater opportunities for organizations working on this issue to have 
an impact by engaging directly with possible allies and organizing advocates both during and between 
elections. Having access to these funds provided advocates with a more comprehensive toolkit of options to 
engage with the opposition and pursue a strong legislative strategy. All three campaigns funded by Atlantic 
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(CCIR, RI4A, and A4C) have used their 501(c)(4) designations to strengthen pro-immigration reform and to 
engage in a more sophisticated legislative battle. 
Atlantic was the biggest contributor of 501(c)(4) funding to the immigration reform field from 2004 to 2014. 
The magnitude of Atlantic’s contributions allowed for a more defined and powerful legislative strategy. By 
mobilizing voters and being able to focus on electoral politics, 501(c)(4) funding enabled advocates to exert 
more influence over legislators in their districts. “The ability to be effective…comes from having [501(c)(4)] 
funding. One of the keys to our movement’s success is that the political class is now convinced…that Latino, 
Asian, and [other] immigrant voters…care deeply about immigration.”93 501(c)(4) funding was perceived by 
advocates as resulting in legislators taking them more seriously and listening more closely than they had 
previously. This was a contributing factor in making immigration reform a gateway issue. 
Many advocates felt that the infusion of 501(c)(4) funding through the campaign pressured the key players in 
the immigration reform movement to come together and agree upon strategy. Having a comprehensive 
immigration reform strategy led to more focused messaging and communications and contributed to an overall 
increase in visibility of immigration reform in the US. Others felt that the perception of 501(c)(4) dollars gave 
the immigration reform advocates their greatest power. “It allowed them to play above their weight class in a 
way that [501(c)(3)] dollars wouldn’t have allowed.”94 
Among the many advantages of 501(c)(4) funding, it is believed that these funds enabled advocates to 
leverage the power of the electorate to take a stronger stance and influence politics. Advocates were able to 
keep political pressure on elected officials through civic engagement activities designed to mobilize the Latino 
voter base. The combination of having a unified advocacy strategy, mobilizing the base, and getting the 
message out enabled the field to elevate the issue of immigration reform and change the public discourse. 
The influx of 501(c)(4) funding contributed to organizations developing related 501(c)(4) organizations to serve 
as conduits to access these funds. With Atlantic being the biggest contributor of 501(c)(4) funds to the field of 
immigration reform, and with their grantmaking coming to an end, many interviewees expressed concern about 
the imminent dearth of 501(c)(4) funding. Advocates are worried that there are not many funders who are able 
to or interested in providing 501(c)(4) funding. As described by one Atlantic grantee, “We have built a lot of 
capacity and it’s not clear if we will be able to sustain that capacity for the fights ahead of us. I’m worried about 
financial sustainability or if we will need to retract some resources.”95 Critics of Atlantic feel that the magnitude 
and strategic focus of their funding has negatively impacted the field: “I wish they would have…made more 
long-term investments, seen that work at the state- and local-level was important and contributed to that 
infrastructure. They put new assets in the field [and] they created imbalances.”96 
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The Future 
When thinking about future comprehensive immigration reform implementation and the potential challenges it 
may pose, there are lessons to be drawn from past changes to immigration policy, specifically the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, and the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) of 
2012. IRCA provides an example of how administrative inefficiencies hampered the implementation process, 
leading to undue challenges in the procedural path to citizenship. As learned from IRCA, “a short 
implementation schedule combined with insufficient funding in 1986 resulted in incomplete and unclear 
administrative and operational structures, delayed regulations, insufficient outreach and public information, 
inadequate training, and inconsistencies in decisionmaking that resulted in litigation.”97 
Over two and a half decades later with the implementation of DACA, a policy directive issued by President 
Obama in June 2012, similar challenges came to light. A 2013 press release issued by the Center for American 
Progress cites that “a year after its implementation, close to 600,000 people have applied and more than 
430,000 have received the status.”98 Multiple barriers slowed the process of 
being granted deferred action such as high application fees, insufficient 
outreach to poorer or more rural communities, a complex application process, 
and fear of deportation. DACA was seen as a test run; approximately 1.7 
million unauthorized immigrant youth were estimated to meet the DACA 
criteria99 compared to the approximately 4 million to 6 million immigrants 
eligible for DAPA or the 11 million total unauthorized immigrants living within 
the US who would potentially be eligible through comprehensive immigration 
reform.100 Overwhelmingly, interviewees expressed concern that current local 
level infrastructure available has been inadequate to process DACA 
applicants—raising questions about the feasibility of implementing a program 
with millions more eligible individuals. 
Looking toward the future and highlighting lessons learned from IRCA and 
DACA, interviewees agreed that there is not enough local-level capacity to 
process potentially 11 million eligible individuals. This would especially be 
true in areas of the US with new and rising immigrant populations. 
Organizations are in need of 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) funds—501(c)(3) funds for organizational capacity 
building and providing programs and services to immigrants, and 501(c)(4) funds for building and sustaining 
electoral power to protect and defend immigrants’ rights. There is also a sense that these lessons have not 
been fully learned and internalized, as resources have yet to be applied to building these capacities among 
immigrant-serving organizations. 
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Some long-term observers believe that less local capacity exists today than it did 20 years ago: “there are 
fewer resettlement agencies [that] had the capacity in the late 1970s or early 1980s coming out of the South 
Asian resettlement and that became the backbone of IRCA implementation. We don’t have that capacity 
anymore.”101 This lack of capacity to implement a large-scale program left many interviewees perplexed about 
the immigration reform field’s true capacity to affect widespread, long-term improvements for the future. 
Specific areas identified by interviewees in need of further development include: communications and 
outreach to inform individuals about their eligibility, community-based organizations providing services to 
immigrant communities, and organizations providing legal services. Many of the interviewees felt that while the 
existing community based infrastructure was strong in most places, almost all indicated that it was nowhere 
near ready to deal with the magnitude of applications that would result with the passing of comprehensive 
immigration reform legislation. 
DACA has been a valuable lesson, though, and has given organizations an opportunity to test their response. 
As described by one interviewee, “The investments made in the [DACA] infrastructure will be the foundation to 
build [from].”102 This interviewee emphasized the importance of expanding the number of stakeholders 
working to help people invest in building the connection between various groups—the educators, the churches, 
the local immigration reform organizations, and others. This emphasizes the importance of “connecting the 
dots between lots of different stakeholders to increase services to immigrants once we are in implementation 
mode.”103 A few interviewees noted that the US has come far since the challenges of IRCA in 1986: “We now 
have a more sophisticated grassroots leadership. Churches, community centers, NGOs, etc. It’s a system that’s 
permanent and reliable. This can be expanded. Part of this expansion will need to include the nontraditional 
organizations that are in frequent contact with immigrant communities.”104 
The capacities that are most needed are largely for implementing an immigration program, and would fall to 
direct service organizations based in communities with immigrants. Atlantic’s funding strategies have 
predominantly focused on creating political will. This same political will required to get the legislation passed 
will be required to secure and protect implementation—and will largely not fall to direct service organizations 
but to advocacy organizations. As described by one Atlantic representative, “there’s a whole other battle that 
will ensue once legislation gets passed. 501(c)(3) funders will be able to put more resources into the 
implementation piece.”105 
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In addition to continued advocacy at all levels to fight for and secure the rights and protections of immigrants, 
the field was also encouraged to think longer-term to lay the groundwork for a successful implementation of 
a future policy change: 
• Technology: Develop a system that might enable high quality, large-scale applicant processing. 
• Capacity of field organizations: Funders should work to maintain and increase the capacity of local-
level immigrant-serving organizations; these organizations are likely to be the on the frontlines of 
outreach and coordination. 
• Training: Plan for how training may be deployed to grow the pool of licensed/sanctioned paperwork 
processors. 
• ACA implementation: Build on ACA implementation. Since ACA outreach efforts are likely to be in many 
of the same communities that would be affected by an immigration reform program, the relationships 
and approaches that are put in place through ACA outreach could benefit coordination efforts in the 
future. 
• Creative outreach: Develop innovative models for outreach. How might churches, local businesses, 
community centers, and other places in the community be used to support outreach and enrollment in 
the future? 
Over the past decade Atlantic has invested heavily in the legislative battle, supplying 501(c)(4) funds enabling 
organizations to engage in the politics of the fight. Given the changing demographics of the nation, it appears 
to be a matter of time and opportunity before comprehensive immigration reform is passed. Looking forward a 
key question to ask of the advocacy strategy is at what point is attention given to the capacity of the local, 
direct service organizations that will be vital during the implementation process? Can the funding community 
coordinate and provide enough support simultaneously to the advocacy community to secure and defend a 
major immigration policy change and to local-level immigrant-serving organizations to prepare for 
implementation? 
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Conclusion 
Immigration reform advocates have made significant progress in the past decade. The last ten years represent 
a period of all-time high funding, a growth in the size and strength of the advocacy field, and a marked 
improvement in the public dialogue about immigrants. The executive actions of President Obama will provide 
temporary protection for nearly half of undocumented immigrants living within the US, and there have been 
promising developments at the state-level in the form of immigrant-friendly legislation, but we’re not there yet. 
An estimated 11 million undocumented immigrants still live within the borders of the US, their children attend 
American schools, and they work beside us in the American economy, but they are without a full set of civil 
rights. By continuing to withhold a full complement of civil rights from immigrants living and working within the 
US we create a caste of people who are more likely to be abused and treated unequally, and we allow our 
democracy to be eroded. 
The vision set forth by The Atlantic Philanthropies over a decade ago is just as relevant today as it was then: for 
Congress to enact a comprehensive and rights-centered policy reform to protect the rights of US immigrants, 
both documented and undocumented. The prospects for federal legislative immigration reform are impossible 
to tell. At times it feels like it will take another lifetime until Congress musters the will to address this thorny, 
complex issue. And other times it feels inevitable—as of July 2014 68% of Americans said that undocumented 
immigrants should be allowed to stay in the US legally.106 While we cannot predict the future, what we can say 
is that the field of immigration reform advocates has more capacity than ever before. There is no time like the 
present. 
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Research Methods 
Innovation Network staff contribute diverse, multidisciplinary methodologies to our evaluation and research. 
We value participatory evaluation, and seek to include the perspectives of people who affect and are affected 
by the social issues we assess. We understand that data collected in applied social science research may be 
influenced by research design, researchers, and many other factors. The analysis of data and the creation of 
knowledge is a product of the process—not a naturally occurring, intrinsic truth. With these considerations in 
mind, we made every effort to collect and analyze our data responsibly to create a fair, impartial assessment. 
This project was funded by The Atlantic Philanthropies. The purpose of the project was to develop a reflective 
synthesis that provides a summation of Atlantic’s contribution to immigration reform and to develop a set of 
sharable lessons related to long-term advocacy issue engagement for Atlantic, like-minded philanthropies, and 
advocates. 
This project has advised by an advisory council: Ana Avendano, Vice President, Labor Participation, United Way 
Worldwide; Mehrdad Azemun, Field Director, National People's Action; Sue Chinn, Campaign Director, Alliance 
for Citizenship; Adey Fisseha, Program Officer, Unbound Philanthropy; Cristina Jiménez, Managing Director, 
United We Dream; Aarti Kohli, Principal, Kohli Strategic Consulting; Kica Matos, Director of Immigrant Rights 
and Racial Justice, Center for Community Change; Angelica Salas, Executive Director, CHIRLA; Darren Sandow, 
Executive Director, Hagedorn Foundation; Eric K. Ward, former Atlantic Programme Executive U.S. 
Reconciliation and Human Rights, The Atlantic Philanthropies; and Ben Kerman, Evaluation Executive, The 
Atlantic Philanthropies. 
Project planning began in May 2013, data was collected from October 2013 to October 2014, and analysis 
and report writing occurred from August 2014 to March 2015. 
Data Sources 
This project was informed by 41 interviews with 38 key informants. Key informants were immigration reform 
advocates, funders, academics, representatives from labor, journalists, observers, and others who had a 
valuable perspective on the last decade of immigration issues. Past Atlantic grantees in the area of federal 
immigration reform were surveyed, and extensive review of Atlantic grant documentation was conducted. In 
addition, web research was conducted. 
Analysis Notes 
Researchers took detailed interview notes, coded the interview data and conducted multiple rounds of 
thematic analysis. Emerging findings were shared with the advisory council and based on their feedback, 
additional data was collected and incorporated into the report. 
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Acronyms 
A4C Alliance for Citizenship 
AAF The Atlantic Advocacy Fund 
ACA Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act  
CAP Center for American Progress 
CCC Center for Community Change 
CCIR Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
CHIRLA Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles 
DACA Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
DAPA Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent 
Residents 
DREAM Act Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act 
DREAMers Individuals who meet the requirements for the Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act 
H.R.4437 Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 
2005 
ICIRR Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights  
IIRIRA Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
IRCA Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
NAOC New American Opportunity Campaign 
NCLR National Council of La Raza 
NDLON National Day Laborer Organizing Network 
NGO Non-governmental organization  
NIF National Immigration Forum 
NILC National Immigration Law Center 
NYIC New York Immigration Coalition 
PCUN Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste 
RI4A Reform Immigration FOR America 
S.1348 Comprehensive Reform Act of 2007 
S.2611 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006 
S.744 Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization 
Act of 2013 
SEIU Service Employees International Union  
TAF The Advocacy Fund (formerly the Tides Advocacy Fund) 
UNITE HERE Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees International Union 
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Immigration Reform Organizations, 2004 to 
2014 
These organizations were identified through the course of data collection, primarily interviews and grant 
document review. This list is not an exhaustive list of all immigration reform organizations. Instead, this 
represents the constellation of immigration reform organizations whose work in some way related to the 
comprehensive immigration reform strategy of The Atlantic Philanthropies over the past decade. 
Direct Grantees of Atlantic’s US Federal Policy Change Strategy 
Alliance for Citizenship (A4C), Washington, DC,  
www.allianceforcitizenship.org 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), New York, NY, 
www.aclu.org 
American Immigration Council (AIC) (previously the 
American Immigration Law Foundation), Washington, 
DC,  
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org 
America’s Voice, Washington, DC,  
www.americasvoice.org 
Applied Research Center, Oakland, CA, 
www.raceforward.org 
Brave New Films, Culver City, CA, 
www.bravenewfilms.org 
Center for Community Change Action (CCCAction) 
(formerly Campaign for Community Change), 
Washington, DC, www.cccaction.org 
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC), Silver 
Spring, MD, www.cliniclegal.org 
Center for Community Change (CCC), Washington, DC, 
www.communitychange.org 
Center for Civic Action, Albuquerque, NM, 
www.civicpolicy.com 
Citizens for a Better Arizona, Phoenix, AZ, 
www.citizensforabetteraz.org 
Coalition for Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CCIR), 
Washington, DC 
Colorado Immigrant Rights Coalition (CIRC), Denver, CO, 
www.coloradoimmigrant.org 
Florida Immigrant Coalition (FLIC), Miami, FL, 
www.floridaimmigrant.org 
Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrant Refugees 
(GCIR), Sebastopol, CA, www.gcir.org 
Heartland Alliance’s National Immigrant Justice Center, 
Chicago, IL, www.immigrantjustice.org 
Jobs With Justice Education Fund, Washington, DC, 
www.jwj.org 
Junta for Progressive Action, New Haven, CT, 
www.juntainc.org 
The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, 
Washington, DC, www.civilrights.org 
Mexican American Legal Defense Education Forum 
(MALDEF), Los Angeles, CA, www.maldef.org 
National Council of La Raza (NCLR), Washington, DC, 
www.nclr.org 
National Day Laborer Organizing Network (NDLON), Los 
Angeles, CA, www.ndlon.org 
National Immigration Forum (NIF), Washington, DC, 
www.immigrationforum.org 
National Immigration Law Center  
(NILC), Los Angeles, CA, www.nilc.org 
National People's Action, Chicago, IL, www.npa-us.org 
New America Media, San Francisco, CA, 
www.newamericamedia.org 
New Organizing Institute, Washington, DC, 
www.neworganizing.com 
The New American Leaders Project, New York, NY, 
www.newamericanleaders.org 
PICO National Network (PICO) Action Fund, Oakland, CA, 
www.piconetwork.org 
Reform Immigration FOR America (RI4A), Washington, 
DC,  
www.reformimmigrationforamerica.org 
The Advocacy Fund, San Francisco, CA 
University of California at Berkeley, Latino Voting and 
Immigration Institute, Berkeley, CA 
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Immigration Reform Organizations Who Did Not Receive Funds Directly from Atlantic’s US 
National Immigration Reform Strategy 
AFL-CIO, Washington, DC, www.aflcio.org 
Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC), Washington, DC,  
www.bipartisanpolicy.org 
Black Immigration Network, Oakland, CA, 
www.blackimmigration.net 
Bridge Project, Washington, DC,  
www.bridgeproject.com 
California Dream Network, Los Angeles, CA, (CDN), 
www.cadreamnetwork.org 
CAMBIO (coalition) 
www.cambio-us.org 
CASA de Maryland (CASA), Hyattsville, MD, 
www.casademaryland.org 
Cato Institute, Washington, DC,  
www.cato.org 
Center for American Progress (CAP), Washington, DC, 
www.americanprogress.org 
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights 
of Los Angeles (CHIRLA), Los Angeles 
CA, www.chirla.org 
Democracy Alliance, Washington, DC,  
www.democracyalliance.org 
Detention Watch Network (DWN), Washington, DC,  
www.detentionwatchnetwork.org 
DreamActivist, Inglewood, CA, 
www.action.dreamactivist.org 
Enlace, Portland, OR,  
www.enlaceintl.org 
Essential Worker Immigration Coalition (EWIC), 
Washington, DC, www.ewic.org 
Fair Immigration Reform Movement (FIRM), 
www.fairimmigration.org 
Gamaliel Foundation, Chicago, IL, www.gamaliel.org 
Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (ICIRR), 
Chicago, IL,  
www.icirr.org 
Immigration Policy Center (IPC), Washington, DC,  
www.immigrationpolicy.org 
ImmigrationWorks USA, Washington, DC, 
www.immigrationworksusa.org 
Iowa Immigration Education Coalition, Des Moines, IA,  
www.iowaimmigrationeducation.org 
Migration Policy Institute (MPI), Washington, DC,  
www.migrationpolicy.org 
National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean 
Communities (NALACC), Chicago, IL, www.nalacc.org 
National Partnership for New Americans, Chicago, IL, 
www.partnershipfornewamericans.org 
National Restaurant Association (NRA), 
Washington, DC, www.restaurant.org 
New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC), New York, NY, 
www.thenyic.org 
OneAmerica, Bethesda, MD www.oneamerica.com 
One Arizona, Phoenix, AZ, www.onearizona.org 
Partnership for a New American Economy (PNAE), New 
York, NY, www.renewoureconomy.org 
Promise Arizona (PAZ), Phoenix, AZ, www.promiseaz.org 
Rights Working Group (RWG), Washington, DC,  
www.rightsworkinggroup.org 
Service Employees International Union (SEIU), 
Washington, DC, www.seiu.org 
Southern Border Communities Coalition (SBCC), CA, AZ, 
NM, TX, www.soboco.org 
The Center for Migration Studies (CMS), New York, NY, 
www.cmsny.org 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), 
Syracuse, NY,  
http://trac.syr.edu 
US Chamber of Commerce, Washington, DC, 
www.uschamber.com 
US Conference of Catholic Bishops, Washington, DC, 
www.usccb.org 
United We Dream (UWD), Washington, DC, 
www.unitedwedream.org 
UNITE HERE, New York, NY, www.unitehere.org 
We Belong Together (multi-organization initiative), 
www.webelongtogether.org 
Workers Defense Project, Austin, TX, 
www.workersdefense.org 
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Atlantic’s Grantmaking to US Federal 
Immigration Reform, 2004 to 2014 
Atlantic invested $70.3 million in US federal immigration reform from 2004 to 2014. This information is 
derived from Atlantic grant documentation. 
 
Atlantic invested $10,000,000 in CCIR. $9,216,219 was used by the campaign, and 
$783,781 went to other organizations working with the campaign. 
 
Organization  Funding 
Amount 
Immigrant Vote 2004 $     119,274  
New American Freedom Summer $ 384,141  
Nueva Vista Group $ 86,025  
National Council of La Raza $ 40,000  
Asian Americans Advancing Justice107 $ 40,000  
We Are America $ 114,341  
Subtotal $ 783,781  
CCIR Total $ 10,000,000 
% reinvested  8% 
 
Atlantic invested $5,000,000 in RI4A. $4,675,000 was used by the campaign, and 
$325,000 went to other organizations working with the campaign. 
 
Organization  Funding 
Amount 
National Immigration Forum $ 25,000  
Center for Community Change $ 300,000  
Subtotal $ 325,000  
RI4A Total $ 5,000,000 
% reinvested  7% 
  
 
107 Formerly the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium. 
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Atlantic invested $5,500,000 in A4C. $495,847 was used by the campaign, and 
$5,004,153 went to other organizations working with the campaign. 
 
Organization  Funding 
Amount 
America's Voice $     311,008  
Asian Americans Advancing Justice108 $ 100,000  
Californians for Humane $ 70,000  
Center for American Progress $ 107,196  
Casa in Action $ 235,000  
CAUSA of Oregon $ 10,000  
Center for Community Change $ 1,913,518  
Center for Popular Democracy $ 30,000  
CHIRLA in Action  $ 100,000  
Colorado Immigrant Rights Coalition Action Fund  $ 40,000  
Civic Empowerment Coalition  $ 44,709  
Community Organization in Action  $ 70,000  
El Centro de lgualda $ 5,000  
Erica Leigh Johnson (IA) $ 10,000  
Florida Immigrant Coalition $ 35,000  
Florida New Majority $ 70,000  
Gamaliel Foundation  $ 60,000  
Idaho Community Action $ 5,000  
Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (ICIRR) $ 71,871  
Immigrant Law Center of Minnesota $ 10,000  
Latin American Coalition $ 26,000  
Leadership Conference for Civil and Human Rights  $ 83,175  
Make the Road  $ 30,000  
Massachusetts Immigrant and Rights Advocacy Coalition  $ 45,000  
METRO IAF  $ 15,000  
Metropolitan Congregations United of St. Louis $ 20,000  
Mi Familia Vota $ 15,000  
 
108 Formerly the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium. 
Advocacy, Politics, and Philanthropy: A Reflection on a Decade of Immigration Reform Advocacy 50 
Michigan Organizing Project  $ 483,222  
National Immigration Forum  $ 50,000  
National Immigration Law Center Immigration Justice Fund $ 40,000  
National People’s Action Campaign $ 400,361  
National Council of La Raza $ 21,000  
New Orleans Workers Center for Racial Justice (LA) $ 152,000  
New York State Immigration Forum  $ 4,000  
North Carolina Latin $ 35,000  
Ohio Organizing Campaign  $ 25,000  
OneAmerica (WA) $ 48,093  
PICO Action Fund $ 10,000  
PLAN in Action $ 8,000  
Riverwind Consulting  $ 10,000  
Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition  $ 10,000  
Texas Organizing Project $ 80,000  
USA Action  $ 15,000  
Virginia Organizing Project $ 10,000  
Voces de la Frontera (WI) $ 5,000  
West Virginia Healthy Kids and Family Coalition  $ 20,000  
Workers Defense Action $ 45,000  
Subtotal $ 5,004,153  
A4C Total $ 5,500,000 
% reinvested  91% 
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Atlantic invested $49,815,250 directly into other organizations within its US federal 
immigration reform strategy. 
 
Organization  Funding 
Amount 
Advocacy Fund, The $ 15,209,750  
American Civil Liberties Union $ 3,900,000  
American Immigration Law Foundation $ 200,000  
American Prospect $ 150,000  
America's Voice $ 8,850,000  
Applied Research Center, The $ 550,000  
Brave New Films $ 200,000  
Center for Community Change $ 1,950,000  
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. $ 900,000  
Center for Civic Action $ 400,000  
Colorado Immigrant Rights Coalition Action Fund $ 400,000  
Florida Immigrant Coalition $ 170,000  
Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees $ 110,000  
Heartland Alliance for Human Needs & Human Rights $ 4,300,000  
Innovation Network, Inc. $ 678,000  
Citizens for a Better Arizona  $ 425,000  
Gamaliel Faith and Democracy Campaign  $ 300,000  
Junta for Progressive Action, Inc. $ 75,000  
Latino Victory Party $ 1,000,000  
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights $ 400,000  
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Education Fund $ 1,100,000  
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund $ 450,000  
National Council of La Raza $ 750,000  
National Day Laborer Organizing Network $ 200,000  
National Immigration Forum $ 60,000  
National Immigration Forum Action fund  $ 200,000  
National Immigration Law Center - Immigrant Justice Fund $ 375,000  
National People's Action $ 400,000  
New Organizing Institute $ 100,000  
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New World Foundation $ 50,000  
Oxfam-America Inc. $ 2,000,000  
Pacific News Service/New America Media $ 1,900,000 
Partnership for New American Economy $ 500,000 
PICO Action Fund $ 200,000 
Regents of the University of California at Berkeley $ 712,500 
Sixteen Thirty Fund $ 650,000 
Subtotal $ 49,815,250 
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